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ABSTRACT 
There are two fundamental expectations from Cloud-IoT applications using sensitive 
and personal data: data utility and user privacy. With the complex nature of cloud-IoT 
ecosystem, there is a growing concern about data utility at the cost of privacy. While the current 
state-of-the-art encryption schemes protect users’ privacy, they preclude meaningful 
computations on encrypted data. Thus, the question remains “how to help IoT device users 
benefit from cloud computing without compromising data confidentiality and user privacy”? 
Cloud service providers (CSP) can leverage Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes to 
deliver privacy-preserving services. However, there are limitations in directly adopting FHE-
based solutions for real-world Cloud-IoT applications. Thus, to foster real-world adoption of 
FHE-based solutions, we propose a framework called Proxy re-ciphering as a service. It 
leverages existing schemes such as distributed proxy servers, threshold secret sharing, 
chameleon hash function and FHE to tailor a practical solution that enables long-term privacy-
preserving cloud computations for IoT ecosystem. We also encourage CSPs to store minimal 
yet adequate information from processing the raw IoT device data. Furthermore, we explore a 
way for IoT devices to refresh their device keys after a key-compromise. To evaluate the 
framework, we first develop a testbed and measure the latencies with real-world ECG records 
from TELE ECG Database. We observe that i) although the distributed framework introduces 
computation and communication latencies, the security gains outweighs the latencies, ii) the 
throughput of the servers providing re-ciphering service can be greatly increased with pre-
processing iii) with a key refresh scheme we can limit the upper bound on the attack window 
post a key-compromise. Finally, we analyze the security properties against major threats faced 
by Cloud-IoT ecosystem. We infer that Proxy re-ciphering as a service is a practical, secure, 
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scalable and an easy-to-adopt framework for long-term privacy-preserving cloud computations 
for encrypted IoT data. 
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CHAPTER 1.    INTRODUCTION TO CLOUD BASED IoT 
1.1 Overview  
1.1.1 Internet of Things   
Internet of Things (IoT) refers to a system where devices with embedded sensors and 
actuators in the physical world are connected to the Internet through wired or wireless 
communication channels and can be uniquely identified and addressed. IoT, a vision that was 
conceived in the early 2000s, has become a reality today, allowing users to connect everything 
from industrial components like gas turbines, freight goods, industrial heating and ventilation 
equipment to everyday consumer devices like light bulbs, door lock, washing machines etc., 
to the Internet. The pervasive presence of the IoT devices around humans has given the devices 
the ability to measure, infer and even alter the human environment. This has become possible 
primarily due to several advancements in technologies like wireless networks, embedded 
sensors, and cloud computing, to name a few, over the years.  In a nutshell, an IoT ecosystem 
offers the following benefits to users, when compared to a traditional IT infrastructure: 
i) communication: the ability to collect and transfer information from various sensors 
like temperature sensor, air purity monitoring sensors, heart rate monitoring sensors 
etc. 
ii) remote control: the ability to control the environment remotely, like turning on air 
conditioners at home from the office, remotely administering insulin delivery for a 
patient, unlocking home door from a car etc.  
iii) correctness: the ability to avoid human errors arising from manual entries during high 
precision recordings like in heart rate monitoring, supply chain logistics management 
etc. 
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iv) cost: the ability to effectively minimize the cost associated with managing an 
application infrastructure by means of data, like analyzing sensor data to minimize 
equipment failures with a planned maintenance, reducing fuel consumption by 
monitoring drive behavior etc. 
Hence, it comes as no surprise that the US National Intelligence Council named IoT as 
one of the six disruptive technologies that will potentially impact US interests by 2025 [1].  
Since a multitude of applications take advantage of IoT, diverse classes of IoT devices have 
been developed over the years, ranging from wireless sensor networks to fitness bands to smart 
meters to connected vehicles. These diverse types of devices typically vary in their processing 
power, cost, buffer space, size, and user interfaces, to name a few aspects. Small devices that 
are limited in their power, CPU and memory are termed as constrained devices by the IETF 
[2]. IETF has also roughly classified the constrained devices into three classes (𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 − 𝑁 for 
𝑁 = 0,1,2 )  depending on the device capabilities [2] as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Constrained node classification [2] 
Name Data size  
(KB)  
Code size 
(KB) 
Class 0 <10  <100 
Class 1 ~10 ~100 
Class 2 ~50 ~250 
 
Class 0 devices typically include sensor-like motes that are very limited in their 
memory and processing power. They connect to the Internet using other computationally 
powerful devices like gateways. Class 1 devices are relatively constrained in processing power 
and memory and connect to the Internet using lightweight protocol stacks like Constrained 
Application Protocol over UDP [3].  Class 2 devices are relatively less constrained and can 
3 
 
 
 
support protocol stacks like HTTP, although they are usually designed to use lightweight 
protocols to improve efficiency and cost.   
Figure 1 shows a typical IoT ecosystem where IoT devices capture information and 
share it to the cloud-based servers via gateways.   
 
Figure 1. An example of IoT ecosystem 
 
There are two fundamental expectations from IoT applications: data security and data 
utility. Data security circles around the Confidentiality-Integrity-Availability triad [4] which 
in the context of IoT device data can be informally and appropriately defined as the follows:  
• Confidentiality: the data generated by an IoT device is protected by allowing only users 
(device owner, legitimate recipients, etc.) who can prove their identity and have 
appropriate privileges to access the data 
• Integrity: the data generated by an IoT device should not be altered throughout its 
lifecycle by anyone, including the device owners  
• Availability: the data generated by an IoT device should be readily available to the 
appropriate users (device owners, legitimate recipients, etc.) upon request  
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Data utility refers to using raw data generated by the devices to make intelligent 
decisions that can help the end-users. With the embedded sensors in IoT devices continuously 
collecting data about the human environment, device owners are interested in more than just a 
mere collection and storage of the raw device data in the cloud servers. Rather, they expect 
useful services like intelligent insights with daily statistics, periodic reports, and alerts from 
anomaly detection, to name a few. For example, people using fitness bands expect to see their 
resting heart rate values, number of steps walked in a day, number of hours of deep sleep in a 
day, the stress levels throughout the day, etc. Thus, it becomes imperative for IoT device 
vendors to design a back-end infrastructure that can handle and process the device data while 
meeting the above-mentioned requirements of their consumers.  
 
1.1.2 Cloud Computing  
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has provided the following 
definition for “cloud computing” capturing its essential and multi-faceted aspects:  "cloud 
computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a 
shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, 
applications and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal 
management effort or service provider interaction." [5]. Over the years, cloud computing has 
enabled the realization of new computing paradigms owing to its ability to provide nearly 
unlimited storage and processing capabilities, in turn hugely impacting the IT industry.  
Cloud service providers are companies that leverage cloud computing and offer cloud-
based solutions such as Infrastructure as a Service (e.g. Amazon Web Service [6], Microsoft 
Azure [7]), Platform as a service (e.g. Red hat OpenShift [8]) and Software as a service 
(Salesforce [9]). Cloud service providers facilitate off-premise storage and processing, 
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enabling companies to offload the overhead associated with maintaining on-premise 
infrastructures, managing IT personnel and expanding them as required.  Furthermore, the 
system of virtually distributed, powerful and always up-to-date servers hosted by the cloud 
service providers can guarantee better resiliency, scalability and security compared to a 
traditional computing system, while at the same time being cost-effective. These salient 
features are essentially responsible for the recent transformation in the business models of 
various industries ranging from transportation to manufacturing to IT companies  [10]- [11].  
In the following section, the current study provides a high-level functional overview of 
the state-of-the-art cloud storage and processing services provided by the cloud service 
providers.  
1.1.2.1 Cloud Storage  
A typical cloud storage model involves clients storing data (e.g. images, text files) in 
the cloud server and querying it later when they want to view the data. For example, service 
likes Amazon S3 [6], Azure storage [7], Google Drive [12] and Dropbox [13]. Clients typically 
use a secure channel to transfer the data to the cloud to prevent an adversary from 
eavesdropping on the channel. In case the information shared with the cloud servers is sensitive 
(e.g. business critical data), clients can encrypt the sensitive and critical data before uploading 
the data to the cloud servers.  An encrypted data, by the virtue of encryption, is protected 
against eavesdropping over an unsecure wireless channel (security for data in-transit) and 
against data leakage after storing in the cloud servers (security for data at-rest). Clients can 
also use encrypted query processing to conceal access patterns from the cloud servers [7, 8] 
and decrypt the data after receiving.  
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1.1.2.2 Cloud Compute 
By cloud compute, the current study refers to allowing the cloud servers to process data 
in their servers. Personal assistants like Siri [14] and Alexa [15], to productivity tools like 
Office Online [16] and Google Docs [12], to big data analytics tools like Hadoop [17], are all 
examples of compute services provided by cloud service providers.  Cloud compute services 
are generally data driven in that they rely on providing services by processing huge amounts 
of data shared by the clients. To protect the data during transit and storage, clients typically 
encrypt the data in their local machine and then upload the data to the cloud servers. When the 
data is required for computation, the authorized cloud application first decrypts the data and 
then performs the necessary computation on the data [18]. To protect the result of the 
computation from an adversary, the cloud application re-encrypts the result before sharing with 
the clients.   
The next section provides a brief overview of IoT ecosystem integration with cloud 
computing.  
 
1.1.3 Internet of Things and Cloud  
 In 2011, the number of interconnected IoT devices exceeded the total number of people 
[19] and by 2025 it is expected to reach a value of over 75 billion [20]. This in turn would 
substantially increase the volume of data generated. It is thus evident that IoT will soon  
become one of the main sources of Bigdata [21]. Industrial analysts typically describe the 
nature of Bigdata using the 4V’s: volume (amount of data generated), velocity (rate of data 
generation), veracity (accuracy of data) and variety (diverse nature of data originating from 
varied sources) [21]. It can be inferred that a traditional infrastructure is not efficient for long-
term storage or processing of such enormous amounts of varied data generated by the IoT 
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devices. Interestingly, there exists a perfect symbiotic relation between cloud computing and 
IoT. While IoT generates massive amounts of data, cloud computing can efficiently handle the 
data throughout its lifecycle.  
Several cloud-based IoT applications have been developed over the years that leverage 
the merits of both the ecosystems. Wearables like Fitbit [22] to smart home appliances like 
Nest Thermostat [23] and Ring video doorbells [24] to self-driving cars like Tesla [25], are all 
examples of real-world implementations of Cloud-based IoT applications.  
While outsourcing the task of storing and processing the data to the cloud servers can 
improve efficiency for businesses, it can naturally introduce concerns over the loss of privacy 
and data security for businesses. Encryption schemes, such as AES [26]  can satisfactorily 
address this concern by allowing businesses/end-users to encrypt the data before outsourcing 
them to cloud. Thus, this guarantees the privacy of end-users during the storage phase. 
However, the state-of-the-art encryption schemes do not provide meaningful results when 
cloud servers perform any computation on the encrypted data. An alternate approach is to allow 
cloud servers to decrypt the data before performing any computations and re-encrypt the data 
after the computation. However, it is evident that such a scheme is not privacy-preserving.  
 
1.2 Research Motivation and Objective 
The state-of-the-art encryption schemes allow IoT device users to make use of cloud 
servers to store their encrypted device data. However, it is currently not possible for cloud 
servers to deliver intelligent insights to the device users while preserving their privacy 
completely.  Fully homomorphic encryption schemes have been proposed in the literature as a 
solution to tackle this issue. When a data is encrypted under FHE schemes, it is possible for 
cloud servers to perform computations on it, thereby enabling privacy preserving cloud 
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computations for encrypted IoT data. However, the FHE schemes proposed so far are 
computationally intensive and are unsuitable to be employed on an IoT device.  
   Recent research studies have proposed alternate solutions to assuage this limitation.  
However, there are still challenges in the practical implementation of these solutions for a 
resource constrained IoT ecosystem. Fostering real-world adoption of the FHE based privacy-
preserving computation schemes for IoT ecosystem requires a practical solution with a modest 
overhead for all the entities, ranging from the device vendors, the device users to the cloud 
service providers. Thus, this thesis attempts to answer the question: “how to help IoT device 
users benefit from cloud computing without compromising data confidentiality and user 
privacy?” by proposing a practical framework called Proxy re-ciphering as a service.  It 
leverages existing schemes such as distributed semi-trusted proxy servers and threshold secret 
sharing to tailor FHE schemes for IoT applications, thereby enabling long-term privacy-
preserving cloud computations for encrypted IoT data.  
  
1.3 Thesis Organization  
The rest of the thesis work is organized as follows: 
➢ Chapter 2: Background and literature review of the existing secure and privacy pre-
serving computation schemes  
➢ Chapter 3: Proposal of Proxy re-ciphering as a service to enable privacy-preserving 
computations for IoT devices  
➢ Chapter 4: Case study of Proxy re-ciphering as a service with application to smart 
healthcare ecosystem  
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➢ Chapter 5:  Evaluation of the proposed framework using experimental testbeds and 
theoretical analysis 
➢ Chapter 6: Conclusion and future work  
10 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2.    BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter focuses on various encryption schemes that are proposed in the literature 
along with a special emphasis on schemes that allow privacy-preserving computations on the 
encrypted data. Specific attention is given to the merits and limitations of each of these 
encryption schemes in the context of IoT. After analyzing each of these schemes, a suitable 
encryption scheme is chosen for the current study. During this process, various works proposed 
in the literature are covered that help enable cloud-based privacy-preserving computations on 
the encrypted data. 
The field of End-to-End security encompasses a variety of areas that address various 
concerns related to computer/network security. Specifically, a data is called End-to-End secure 
if its CIA triad is protected from the time of its generation to the time of its consumption.  In 
the context of an IoT ecosystem, end-to-end data security essentially means that data is 
encrypted before it leaves the embedded device and it is not decrypted until it reaches the end-
user (typically an application running on the user’s smartphone/laptop). The goal of such an 
implementation is to secure data against the common attacks, such as eavesdropping 
(confidentiality), man-in-the-middle (integrity, availability) and denial of service (availability) 
to preserve its CIA triad. Employing End-to-End encryption schemes can satisfactorily 
guarantee security of a system against eavesdropping attacks.  
2.1 Conventional Encryption Schemes  
 Most real-world applications that aim to protect the confidentiality of their data use 
conventional encryption schemes.  They can be implemented either in the form of a public-key 
encryption system or as a symmetric key encryption system.  
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Public key cryptography involves two different keys for encryption and decryption 
purposes, named public key and private key, respectively. As the name suggests, every 
participating node/user in a system is given a public key that is not a secret and a private key, 
which is a secret and is known only the node/user. A sender node encrypts the data using the 
public key of the recipient node before sending the data to the recipient. Upon receiving the 
encrypted data, the recipient node decrypts the data using its private key. One of the main 
advantages of this system is the key management and the scalability of the scheme.  
  RSA [27] is one of the most widely used public key cryptographic solutions. The security 
and the hard problem in this primitive are based on finding prime factors of a composite 
number. The length of the key used for encryption is a measure of the security of the system. 
It has been identified that to provide an equivalent level of security compared to AES 
encryption [26] with 128 bits key, RSA requires 3072 bits of key [28] . This is also shown in 
Table 2. In addition, it is close to 1000 times slower than the symmetric key counterparts, due 
to its computational processing power requirements [29]-[30] . This makes asymmetric 
encryption schemes challenging and computationally intensive for constrained IoT devices.  
 Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [32]-[33] is another public key scheme that is based 
on elliptic curves over finite fields.  It requires smaller key size when compared to RSA and is 
a better candidate when using public key cryptography for resource constrained IoT devices. 
The security of ECC is based on the hardness of Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem [31].  
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Table 2. Recommended key size in bits by NIST [29] 
   
 
   
 
  
 
Symmetric key algorithms, on the other hand, perform encryption and decryption using 
a single key that is pre-shared between a sender and a recipient. Symmetric key encryption 
schemes are usually less computationally intensive compared to the asymmetric key encryption 
schemes and require relatively smaller-length key to provide the same level of security 
guarantees compared to asymmetric key encryption schemes [28].   
Currently Advanced Encryption Standard [26] (AES) is one of the most widely 
deployed symmetric-key encryption algorithm and is accepted as a standard by NIST for 
government applications and industrial applications [33][34]. Authors in [35] tested and 
compared the encryption performance of various symmetric key encryption schemes like AES, 
CLEFIA [36], PRINCE [37], SPECK [38], Camellia [39], Midori [40] under a restricted 
memory size of 1024 bytes or less of ROM and 128 bytes or less RAM. Their results show that 
AES was the fastest followed by SPECK. The current work focuses on devices that typically 
belong to Class 1 or Class 2 category of constrained nodes [discussed in Chapter 1 and shown 
in Table 1]. These devices have around 10-50 KB RAM and 100-500 KB ROM. In most IoT 
devices, the cryptographic schemes are implemented as a software component rather than a 
dedicated chip[35]. Therefore, it is practical to choose an algorithm that requires less CPU 
cycles and a modest amount of ROM. Since the current study requires medical IoT devices to 
Symmetric key RSA key Elliptic curve key 
80 1024 160 
112 2048 224 
128 3072 256 
192 7680 384 
256 15360 521 
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only perform encryption, following the results of [35], the current study uses AES encryption 
scheme to encrypt IoT device data before sending to the cloud servers .  
AES is by design optimized for low memory, speed and thus has been deployed across 
platform ranging from 8-bit processors to super power CPU / GPUs [35]. Even x86 
architectures have witnessed instruction-set extensions by Intel [33] for improving the 
performance of  encryption and decryption functions. AES is a block cipher that operates on 
128-bit blocks of data. The number of rounds (𝑛𝑟) of processing depends on the size of the key 
(128/192/256 bits) used in the schemes. As the key length increases, the security of the system 
increases, along with the number of rounds of processing (𝑛𝑟=10 for AES-128, 12 for AES-
192 and 14 for AES-256). The current study uses AES-128 with 𝑛𝑟 = 10. AES provides the 
following modes of operation: Electronic Code Book (ECB), Ciphertext Chain Blocking 
(CBC), and Counter (CTR).  
While AES is energy efficient and provides strong security guarantees, one of the main 
disadvantages is that it does not provide meaningful results, when performing arithmetic or 
logical operations on the ciphertext. Figure 2 shows an example of this limitation. It can be 
seen that when encrypting an integer value of 2 and an integer value of 3, the sum of the 
encrypted ciphertexts does not yield a value equal to encrypting an integer value of five:  
𝐸𝑛𝑐(2) + 𝐸𝑛𝑐(3) ≠ 𝐸𝑛𝑐(5).   
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Figure 2. An example of computation on AES-encrypted data 
 
2.2 Homomorphic Encryption Schemes 
Homomorphic encryption schemes have been proposed to tackle the problem to 
provide secure and privacy-preserving computations on encrypted data, while minimizing the 
communication complexity that secure multi party computation schemes [41]–[43] usually 
witness.  Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos [44] stated the following around 1978 :    
   “It remains to be seen whether it is possible to have a privacy 
homomorphism with a large set of operations which is highly secure” 
In other words, the possibility of building an encryption scheme, that is practical and 
worthwhile to perform arbitrary computations on an encrypted data, without having to decrypt 
during computation, remained an open question for a long time.  
2.2.1 Partially Homomorphic Encryption Schemes  
Partially homomorphic encryption schemes are a class of encryption schemes that 
allow arbitrary number of homomorphic additions or homomorphic multiplications on the 
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encrypted data. A scheme is additively-homomorphic if the result of an addition operation on 
two ciphertexts followed by a decryption, results in the same value as the addition operation 
on the two-plaintexts. Similarly, multiplicatively-homomorphic scheme is one where the result 
of a multiplication operation on two ciphertexts followed by a decryption operation gives the 
same value as the multiplication operation on the two-plaintexts. Table 3  presents the most-
widely used partial homomorphic encryption schemes along with their homomorphic 
properties.   
Table 3. Widely known partially homomorphic encryption schemes 
Encryption scheme 
 
Homomorphic nature 
 Additive                   Multiplicative 
RSA[27] 
 Yes 
ElGamal[45]  
Yes 
Paillier[46] Yes 
 
Goldwasser-Micali[47] Yes 
 
BGN[48] Yes Yes* 
*: allows only one multiplication operation 
 
Table 3 shows that RSA and ElGamal schemes allow multiplication operations over 
the encrypted data while schemes like Galwasser-Micali (GM) and Paillier allow addition 
operations over the encrypted data. Furthermore, BGN encryption scheme allows an arbitrary 
number of addition operations on the encrypted data along with one multiplication operation.  
GM scheme was one of the first schemes to achieve additive homomorphism with probabilistic 
public key crypto system, giving the highest security guarantees. However, one of the 
limitations of this scheme was that it allowed only a single bit data as its plaintext input. In 
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addition, the ciphertexts in this scheme were large, rendering the scheme impractical. Benaloh 
[49] generalized the GM scheme to extend support for plaintext data of up to a bit-length 𝑘 . 
However, it suffered from high cost of decryption [50]. Paillier improved the earlier schemes 
by allowing encryption of plaintext data up to a bit-length 𝑘, while reducing the ciphertext 
expansion during encryption and at the same time maintaining a reasonable encryption and 
decryption costs.  
CryptDB [51] is seminal research work that focused on access control for SQL queries 
on encrypted data. The authors implemented a Paillier cryptosystem to compute arithmetic 
operations like SUM over encrypted data. Authors in [52] proposed DBMask, to address the 
limitations of decrypting data to weaker encryption schemes within the cloud server in 
CryptDB, thus guaranteeing that the security of the data is not weakened with time.  However, 
both DBMask and CryptDB were designed for web applications, with a fully trusted proxy 
server intercepting the communication between a client and a server to apply encryption and 
decryption schemes transparent to the clients. In an IoT application, such an approach can 
potentially conflict with the security and privacy requirements. In addition, it has been 
identified that the solutions are computationally intensive with an overhead of 25% [50].  
Authors in [50] introduced Talos, keeping IoT ecosystems in mind. Their solution does 
not require a fully trusted proxy server and allowed query processing locally in the end-user 
device. They improved the efficiency of Paillier encryption scheme to operate on 32-bit integer 
data, by packing multiple plaintext data in a single ciphertext, thereby allowing parallel 
operations on multiple plaintexts. Along these lines, Pilatus [53] was introduced to overcome 
some of the limitations of Talos. Pilatus further optimized Talos to work on larger plaintext 
data sizes (e.g., 64-bit integers) and introduced data sharing across multiple recipients using 
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proxy re-encryption. The authors of  Pilatus demonstrated their work on data from Fitbit [22] 
servers and on an anonymized data from Awawomen startup [54].  
Despite its merits, partial homomorphic encryption schemes like Paillier, have a 
limitation where they can only be used for algorithms that require either addition or 
multiplication operation (with an exception to BGN) and not a combination of both. However, 
many practical IoT-based applications may require a combination of both, for example, linear 
regression, logistic regression, standard deviation, to name a few.  
2.2.2 Fully Homomorphic Encryption Schemes 
Gentry’s Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [55] is a seminal work that showed that 
it is plausible and achievable to design a FHE scheme, answering the open question raised by 
Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos . However, the scheme is computationally expensive to apply 
in real-life due to the bootstrapping operations. When a noise-level of a ciphertext reaches the 
threshold level, any homomorphic operation performed thereafter can potentially result in 
incorrect results. Gentry addressed this by bootstrapping the ciphertext to transform it into a 
new ciphertext with lesser noise-levels, thereby enabling further operations on the ciphertext. 
BGV [56] scheme, based on Learning With Errors, is currently one of the most widely used 
FHE scheme. It is a leveled FHE scheme that allows evaluation of arithmetic circuits of level 𝐿. 
It does not require bootstrapping and has been optimized to allow practical implementations 
of FHE based solutions. Libraries like HElib  [58]-[59] have been developed using BGV 
schemes and are available for public use, making FHE accessible to researchers and  
application developers.  
Early works on practical applications of FHE attempted to solve real world problems  
[59]-[60] , where the clients ( laptop like devices) encrypted their data using FHE schemes to 
allow a computationally powerful third-party server (like a cloud server) to perform 
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computations on the encrypted data. This was clearly an improvement over to traditional 
encryption schemes where the cloud servers needed to decrypt data to perform computations. 
However, these solutions were proposed for traditional file-based applications running on 
laptop-like devices and are not suitable IoT devices. Furthermore, the computational 
complexity of this scheme is high, even for traditional devices, as it requires homomorphic 
encryption before every single data transfer. In addition, the communicational complexity of 
the scheme is also high due to the size of the ciphertext (for example in [61], the ciphertext-
size is  𝑛 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑞) , where 𝑛 = 2048 and q=2258 to allow single multiplication and a large 
number of additions and the values are larger for applications that require more multiplication 
operations [61]) resulting in high latencies and bandwidth requirement. 
Authors in [35] proposed a possible solution to address this problem. In their scheme, 
the clients can homomorphically encrypt the AES encryption key once and share it with the 
server, as a part of setup phase. During the data flow phase, the client can encrypt the data 
using AES encryption scheme allowing the server to homomorphically evaluate the AES 
decryption function to transform AES encrypted ciphertext to a homomorphic encrypted 
ciphertext. Thus, this scheme allows cloud servers to compute on data encrypted under 
homomorphic scheme, while optimizing the communication complexity. This is discussed in 
great detail in [62] and is available for application developers along with the HElib library. 
This solution clearly relieves the client devices from performing computationally intensive 
task for every single data transfer. Authors in [62] tested their solution on a 4GB RAM Intel 
Core i5-3320M laptop to evaluate its feasibility and performance. However, this approach is 
still not suitable for IoT devices and are computationally intensive, even if the device is 
required to encrypt the AES key under homomorphic encryption scheme just once.  
19 
 
 
 
An alternate approach could be to encrypt the key under homomorphic encryption 
scheme using computationally more powerful devices like a device owner’s smartphone. 
However, there are a couple of limitations in the practical implement of this approach. 
Although algorithms in HElib are constantly optimized and updated, the authors of [62] have 
not tested the algorithms in HElib library for their feasibility and efficiency on lower 
computational devices like IPhones or Android smartphones. In addition, the library is not 
trivially compatible with Android like environments since they are natively written in C++ and 
depend on other libraries like NTL [63] and GMP [64]. In addition, device encryption is 
transparent to end users in some real-world implementations [65]-[66] where device vendors 
often do not store the encryption keys in the end-user apps running on a smartphone / laptop 
[67]. Rather, they rely on secure channel communication using HTTPS between a smartphone 
and the cloud server to download results from cloud servers to the smartphone [65], [68].  
Authors in [69]-[70][71] have proposed a novel privacy-preserving remote patient ECG 
monitoring system. Their work is the first of its kind to show practical feasibility of FHE in 
terms of computational complexity and the storage costs for a real-world medical application 
on the cloud. However, they make a few assumptions that might always not be acceptable.  
They take advantage of a cloudlet (a PC primarily provided by the hospital, in their work) to 
decrypt the AES encrypted data from the IoT device and re-encrypt it using FHE scheme. This 
has a few limitations since it requires hospitals to distribute additional hardware to all patients. 
The other alternative solution requires patients to own a laptop. Although the latter is not a 
very unreasonable assumption, this can however prevent the mobility of the patients as called 
out by the authors themselves [69]. Apart from these, such a solution can quickly become a 
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single point of attack and might not be applicable to real-world implementations like the ones 
discussed in [22], [65], [68].   
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CHAPTER 3.    PROPOSED SOLUTION-PROXY RE-CIPHERING AS A SERVICE 
CloudIoT is a recently introduced paradigm that leverages two complementary 
technologies: Cloud computing and IoT [72]. Over the years, multitudes of CloudIoT 
applications have been developed, aiming to improve the efficiency of the tasks and the quality 
of living for the device users.  From wearables like Fitbit [22] to secure smart homes appliances 
like Ring [24] to self-driving cars like Tesla [25], CloudIoT now has a pervasive presence 
among humans. The demand and expectations from the CloudIoT applications have also 
drastically increased, resulting in a highly competitive IoT market. Yet, there are two 
fundamental expectations from these applications that capture sensitive and personal 
information: data utility and user privacy. In the contemporary world of IoT, with the complex 
nature of data usage between multiple service providers that are typically masked away from 
the end-users, there is a growing concern among device users about receiving utility at the cost 
of their privacy. For example, an early work on understanding the ecosystem of Fitbit found 
that the mega dumps consisting of user activity data were sent to an analytics company called 
Mixpanel [68]. Although the Fitbit ecosystem has changed since then, this example illustrates 
the complicated world of CloudIoT with multiple backend service providers that end-users are 
necessarily not aware of. In a report released by Economist Intelligence Unit in 2018, 74% of 
the surveyed consumers were concerned that small privacy invasions may eventually result in 
loss of civil rights [73].  
Fully homomorphic encryption schemes (FHE) can be leveraged by cloud service 
providers to guarantee privacy-preserving data services to device users. Understandably, 
adopting a new encryption scheme, especially a computationally-intensive and a nascent one, 
can be challenging for existing CloudIoT applications and businesses. A migration from a 
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functioning workflow to a new FHE based workflow can be practically fostered, only when 
the cost associated with the transition is modest for all the entities in the IoT ecosystem ranging 
from the device vendors to the device users to the cloud service providers.  
Solutions proposed in the literature have the following limitations when integrating 
them into a real-world IoT ecosystem : 1) a fully homomorphic encryption scheme is 
computationally intensive to be  deployed on an IoT device 2) a fully trusted cloudlet/proxy 
server to decrypt AES device data and encrypt it using a FHE data can become a single point 
of attack and is not truly privacy-preserving , 3) homomorphic encryption of IoT device keys 
(that are required to transform AES device data to FHE data) demands significant resources 
for computational purposes from the IoT devices and 4) outsourcing heavy computations to 
end-user devices like smartphones / laptops is not possible in some real-world implementations 
where device vendors often do not store the device encryption keys in the end-user apps [67], 
as discussed in chapter 2 .   
Thus, to bridge the gap between the proposed solutions in the literature and their real-
world adoption in the IoT ecosystem, the current work proposes Proxy re-ciphering as a 
service. It leverages existing schemes such as distributed semi-trusted proxy servers, threshold 
secret sharing and FHE to tailor a framework that enables long-term privacy-preserving cloud 
computations for encrypted IoT data.  
 
3.1 Design Goals  
This section will provide a brief overview of the high-level considerations that were 
given before arriving at the proposed solution. Design goals such as the ones considered form 
the salient features of the proposed solution.  
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Security: The data encrypted by an IoT device should not be decrypted by anyone 
other than the end users (device owners / legitimate recipients)  
Availability: The solution should be resilient to any failures (internal or external) to 
ensure that the service is always available to the IoT device users   
Accessibility and deployment readiness: The solution should use existing 
technologies that are publicly available and easily accessible to application developers 
Scalability: The solution should ensure that the storage complexity is acceptable given 
the large ciphertext size of FHE schemes.  
Energy efficiency and Performance: The solution should be lightweight on the IoT 
devices in terms of computational, communicational and storage complexity 
Back-portability: Existing devices that are already operational should be readily able 
to take advantage of the solution 
Transparency:  The solution should be adoptable without requiring any additional 
hardware, for the end-users. Any additional manual/configurational overhead to the device 
users should be modest.  
Practicality: The solution should closely resemble real-world implementations of 
CloudIoT applications, with minimal assumptions.  
 
3.2 Major Cyber Threats 
In this section, we will briefly focus on the major threats faced by cloud-based solutions 
where IoT devices generate data and end-users review the data using their device-companion 
apps. In the following discussion, the proxy servers are intermediary nodes that intercept IoT 
device-cloud communication and pre-process the device data before uploading it to the cloud 
servers.  
24 
 
 
 
Threat 1: Cloud database/server compromise: The current study assumes a semi-
trusted cloud. This means that the server is honest and performs the algorithms correctly, but 
it is not trusted with the private data. Compromising cloud servers can give an adversary access 
to the encrypted data. A rogue administrator can misuse data for monetary incentives.  
Threat 2: Proxy database / server compromise: The current study assumes a semi-
trusted proxy server. An adversary can be interested in attacking the proxy servers to learn 
about the device encryption keys.  
Threat 3: Byzantine proxy storage servers: A special attack on the proxy servers 
where an adversary can maliciously control the behavior of nodes/servers in the system 
resulting in the failure or corruption of data or a combination a both.   
Threat 4: IoT device key compromise: An adversary can remotely launch attacks on 
the resource constrained IoT device to compromise the device key. This is a critical and 
relevant threat in today’s IoT ecosystem[68]-[69]. Most device manufacturers hardcode the 
encryption keys [75] [65], [66], [74], [76] in the devices during the manufacturing phase. When 
such a long-term device key is compromised, the post-compromise security [77] for the IoT 
devices can be jeopardized. 
Threat 5: Network-based attack: An adversary can attack the communication 
channel between different participating nodes in the system like the medical device, gateway, 
proxy servers and the cloud servers. This threat can be launched by a passive or an active 
attacker. Passive attackers are generally interested in learning about data patterns by launching 
eavesdropping attack and active attackers are typically interested in intercepting data to launch 
a man-in-the-middle attack. 
 
25 
 
 
 
3.3 System Architecture  
 In this section, the key components of the proposed system are discussed:    
IoT device  
These are embedded devices that fall under Class 1 and class 2 category of constrained 
devices as defined in Chapter 1 with around 10-50 KB RAM and 100-300 KB ROM. For 
example, Fitbit devices have around 250 KB flash and 32KB SRAM [74]. They  support AES 
encryption to securely transmit the device generated data wirelessly [65]. They typically do 
not store information locally for processing and outsource the computations to cloud servers. 
They communicate only through gateways devices, typically via Bluetooth while other 
protocols like Zigbee are also supported.  
Gateway devices 
These are computationally powerful devices compared to the medical devices. They 
typically function via the device-companion apps running on smartphones (most widely used), 
laptops (supported configuration), enabling portability for the users. They have enough 
resources to support full stack HTTP protocols. They pack (typically as a JSON) the data from 
received from the IoT device before relaying it to cloud servers. They do not perform any other 
computations on the device data.  
Cloud servers  
These servers provide storage and compute services for other businesses. They receive 
device data from the gateway devices. They are computationally powerful and can scale their 
service when required. When a data is encrypted under FHE scheme, cloud servers can perform 
computation on the data and share privacy preserving insights with end-users.  
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Key Manager Server (KMS) 
They are maintained by device vendors or OEMs depending on the implementation. 
They are solely responsible for generating and maintaining the cryptographic keying materials 
and embedding device specific keys during the manufacturing. These servers are 
computationally powerful and are assumed to be very secure.  
Distributed semi-trusted proxy servers  
These are computationally powerful servers that act as an intermediary between 
businesses and their cloud server providers. The current study employs a total of 𝑛 proxy 
servers in a geographical region (across US, for example).  
GUI devices  
These are devices that display the results of cloud computations to the data consumers. 
The proposed system currently supports laptops since the authors in [58] have tested the 
performance on laptop like devices. When an optimized version of the library that is 
compatible with smartphones is available, the current system can be extended to work on 
relatively lower computational systems like smartphone devices.  
 
Figure 3 shows proposed system model comprising of the above-mentioned key 
components along with a brief high-level description of the proposed workflow.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3. The proposed architecture for Proxy re-ciphering as a service 
 
3.4 Model Assumptions  
Given the number and nature of design goals, it was necessary to make few assumptions 
(listed below) which forms the basis of our system mode. Efforts were taken to ensure 
that these assumptions are as modest as possible.   
1. Cloud servers and proxy servers are semi-trusted. They are honest in performing the 
algorithms but are not trusted with sensitive data  
2. Every entity in the system has a unique and random identifier that is not publicly 
known.   
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3. The system chooses 𝑚 proxy servers that are closest to the cloud servers for every 
organization, to provide the service. The value of 𝑚 can differ for each business 
depending on the load like:  
• proxy server’s total capacity 
• maximum server utilization per tenant  
• throughput guaranteed as per the service level agreement  
• incoming traffic load 
A load balancer is assumed to take care of traffic routing between the 𝑚 proxy servers. 
Since the proxy servers are essentially cloud based servers, it is assumed that the system 
always has enough proxy servers to provide service.   
4. The knowledge about an IoT device compromise is available to the system.  
 
3.5 Data Distribution Schemes 
The current study utilizes distributed proxy framework primarily to build a fault 
resilient system against corruption and availability of data and services in the system. The 
following techniques were inspected to select a scheme for distribution of data (which in the 
current case is device encryption keys encrypted under homomorphic scheme). 
Data Replication 
 The traditional technique to guarantee a robust system is to replicate a server data 
across multiple servers (let’s say, 𝑛). This provides a fault resilience [78] up to 𝑛 − 1 servers.  
However, the secret in the current study is the expanded AES-128 homomorphic device key. 
The size of homomorphic ciphertexts generated using widely used homomorphic libraries like 
HElib [57] and SEAL [79] are typically not less than 1MB for one input [80]. Thus, when 
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considering a practical and a scalable solution, replication (across 𝑛 servers) is not be the most 
efficient solution, in terms of storage complexity.  
Threshold secret sharing 
 An informal definition of a threshold secret sharing can be described as follows:  
Definition 1: Let 𝑘 and 𝑛 be positive integers such that 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛. A (𝑘, 𝑛) Threshold 
secret sharing scheme is a way to share a secret 𝑆 with 𝑛 participants such that any group of at 
least 𝑘 participants can pool their shares to compute the value of 𝑆, but no group of 𝑘 −1 or 
fewer should be able to do so.  
Thus in a (𝑘, 𝑛) threshold secret sharing, a secret is split into 𝑛 shares by a mutual 
trusted node (called dealer) and is shared among 𝑛 participating nodes ( called recipients)  such 
that any 𝑘 or more shares are enough to reconstruct the original secret but a fewer than 𝑘 shares 
cannot reproduce the secret. In this scheme, 𝑘 is called the threshold of secret sharing. In other 
words, a threshold secret sharing schemes provide a fault resilience up to 𝑛 − 𝑘 shares. 
 
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme  
Of the many techniques that are available in the literature, the most widely used 
threshold secret sharing technique was proposed by Shamir [81]. In this (𝑘, 𝑛 ) scheme a secret 
message ′𝑠 ′ is being shared among 𝑛 participating nodes in the following way:  
The dealer constructs a secret polynomial 𝑦 = 𝑎(𝑥) of degree 𝑘 − 1  by randomly 
choosing coefficients 𝑎1, 𝑎2, . . , 𝑎𝑘−1 from a finite field 𝐹 and assigns 𝑎0 = 𝑠.  
              𝑎(𝑥) = 𝑠 + 𝑎1𝑥 + 𝑎2𝑥
2 + ⋯ + 𝑎𝑘−1𝑥
𝑘−1 
Then the dealer picks out 𝑛 random points on the polynomial, 𝑥𝑖 , 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 and creates 
shares(𝑠1, 𝑠2  , . . , 𝑠𝑛 ) to distribute share 𝑠𝑖 to recipient 𝑟𝑖, such that  
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𝑠1 = (𝑥1, 𝑦1 = 𝑎(𝑥1)) , 𝑠2 = (𝑥2, 𝑦2 = 𝑎(𝑥2)) , . . , 𝑠𝑛 = (𝑥𝑛, 𝑦𝑛 = 𝑎(𝑥𝑛))     
To reconstruct the secret, a group of 𝑘 recipients should pool their shares  (𝑠1, 𝑠2, … 𝑠𝑘 ) 
and construct Lagrange basis polynomials [82]  𝑙𝑗 (𝑥), 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑘  ,such that  
𝑠 = ∑ 𝑙𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1 (𝑥)𝑦𝑗               
It can be inferred that a subset of authorized participants has a k-out-of-n access 
structure. Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is a perfect secret sharing scheme (PSSS) where a 
subset of non-authorized participants gets no information about the secret and thus advantage 
of a non-authorized subset is same as the advantage of an outsider in computing the correct 
secret. Here, no information is defined in an information-theoretic sense.  
Secret sharing schemes in general have one limitation in that the size of the shares are 
typically at least the size of secret itself. For example, Blakely’s [83] have a share size that are 
𝑘 times larger than the size of the original secret. However, Shamir’s shares have a minimal 
property in that the shares are only as large as the original secret. This is not a serious limitation 
in general where the secrets are typically small, like an AES-128 encryption key. However, in 
the current study, shares of homomorphic encrypted AES keys are distributed to the proxy 
servers. Thus Shamir’s shares with a share-size of  |𝑆| for a secret 𝑆 [84], can incur a high 
storage complexity. 
 
Krawczyk’s secret sharing scheme 
Krawczyk’s scheme [85] is a space efficient hybrid scheme that utilizes PSSS and 
Information dispersal algorithm [86] to generate shares close to a size of  
|𝑆|
𝑘
 where 𝑆 represents 
the original secret. Krawczyk’s scheme relaxes the secrecy from an information-theoretic sense 
to a computational sense, where an adversary has a bounded resource, making it more practical.  
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Information dispersal algorithm (IDA) proposed by Rabin introduces redundancy into 
a given data 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 before partitioning it into 𝑘 fragments of size 
|𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎|
𝑘
 , such that, the 
interpolation of any 𝑘 fragments will result in the reconstruction of 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎. Unlike secret sharing 
schemes, secrecy of the data is inherently not a priority in IDA. In addition, this scheme 
assumes that the participants behave honestly, returning unaltered fragments for 
reconstruction. Krawczyk’s scheme can be explained as follows:  
 
Distribution scheme 
1. Choose a secure private encryption scheme 𝐸𝑁𝐶 and an encryption key 𝐾𝑒𝑦.  
2. Encrypt the secret 𝑆 with 𝐸𝑁𝐶 using 𝐾𝑒𝑦, let 𝐸 = 𝐸𝑁𝐶(𝑆, 𝐾𝑒𝑦) 
3. Use IDA to split the encrypted data 𝐸 into 𝑛 fragments: 𝐸1, 𝐸2, . . , 𝐸𝑛 
4. Use PSS to generate 𝑛 shares of 𝐾𝑒𝑦  : 𝐾𝑒𝑦1, 𝐾𝑒𝑦2, . . , 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑛 
5. Distribute shares 𝑆𝑖 , 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 to each participant 𝑃𝑖 where 𝑆𝑖 = (𝐸𝑖, 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑖) 
Reconstruction scheme  
1. Collect 𝑘 shares 𝑆𝑗 = ( 𝐸𝑗 , 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑗) from participants 𝑃𝑗 , 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑘   
2. Reconstruct 𝐸 from collected 𝐸𝑗 using IDA 
3. Compute 𝐾𝑒𝑦 from 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝑗 using PSSS 
4. Decrypt 𝐸 with function 𝐷𝑒𝑐 using 𝐾𝑒𝑦 to recover 𝑆,  𝑆 =  𝐷𝑒𝑐 (𝐸 , 𝐾𝑒𝑦)  
 
The size of each share received by each participating node is 
|𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎|
𝑘
+ |𝐾𝑒𝑦| . Total size of the 
𝑛 shares is therefore 𝑛. (
|𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎|
𝑘
+ |𝐾𝑒𝑦|) . Krawczyk’s technique is thus a more efficient (since 
|𝐾𝑒𝑦|  <<  |𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎|)   solution for the current study reducing the storage complexity by close to 
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1
𝑘⁄ .The current study takes advantage of the following cryptographic schemes for data 
distribution:  
IDA: Rabin’s IDA scheme 
PSSS: Shamir’s secret sharing scheme  
Private encryption scheme : ChaCha20 [87]  
 
3.6 Proposed Workflow  
A high-level rundown of Proxy re-ciphering as a service is shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5.The 
workflow can be segmented into four phases and the interactions between the entities in each 
phase is now explained in greater detail. 
 
 
Figure 4. High level workflow of Proxy re-ciphering as a service-Phase I-III 
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Figure 5. High level workflow of Proxy re-ciphering as a service-Phase IV 
 
Phase I: System Initialization  
Values for (𝑘, 𝑛) are chosen for the entire system. A device-vendor generates a 128-bit 
AES device key (let’s say 𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣) and initializes it in the IoT device. Every user in the system is 
provided with a unique homomorphic public-private key pair (𝑝𝑘𝑖, 𝑠𝑘𝑖). The context 
information and the keys required for homomorphic encryption schemes are serialized and 
communicated to the proxy servers and the cloud compute servers. The system chooses 𝑚 
proxy servers for every participating business. 
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Phase II: Device setup  
IoT device user (let's say, 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖  ) begins authenticating the account and registering the 
IoT device (let’s say 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑) with the cloud service provider through the gateway device. 
After authenticating, the proxy servers are assigned as the new endpoint to the gateway device, 
by the cloud server. The gateway device now starts to share the data from 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑with the 
cloud server through the proxy servers. During its connection with the gateway device, proxy 
server requests the key manager server for the device encryption key for 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖 , encrypted 
under homomorphic scheme, by sharing public key 𝑝𝑘𝑖 as shown in Algorithm 1. 
 
 
Algorithm 1. Secure sharing of encrypted IoT device key  
 
Algorithm 1 
Secure sharing of IoT device key  
Where: KMS  
Input:𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖 and  𝑝𝑘𝑖 
Output: shares of device key 𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣 encrypted under homomorphic scheme  
  
1. Fetch AES device key 𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣  corresponding to 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖 
  
2. Encrypt AES device key 𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣   using homomorphic encryption scheme:  
 hom_𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣 < − encryptAESkey(𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣 ,  𝑝𝑘𝑖  )  
  
3. Generate (𝑘, 𝑛) shares for hom_𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣 using Krawczyk’s scheme:  
  Encrypt hom_𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣 using ChaCha20 with a random key 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑦 
  𝐸𝑖 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐(hom_𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣, 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑦) 
  Generate Shamir’s shares for 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑦 
     Generate fragments for 𝐸𝑖 using Rabin’s IDA  
   𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 =   (𝐸𝑖, 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑦𝑖) 
   
4. Distribute 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 to 𝑛 cloud proxy servers 
5. Delete hom_𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣  
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KMS runs Algorithm 1 as shown above, upon receiving a request from the proxy 
server. Homomorphic encryption of 𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣 and generation of Krawczyk’s shares were done 
using libraries provided in the literature ([57] ,[88] respectively). At the end of Algorithm 1, 
the KMS deletes ℎ𝑜𝑚_𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣. This ensures that there is no additional storage-overhead for the 
KMS after executing Algorithm 1. This is an important step to ensure that it is practically 
possible for existing KMS infrastructures to run this algorithm with a modest computational 
and storage overhead. At the end of Algorithm 1, shares of ℎ𝑜𝑚_𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣 are distributed to 𝑛 proxy 
servers.  
 
Algorithm 2. Secure reconstruction of encrypted IoT device key 
 
Upon receiving the encrypted key shares, the 𝑚 proxy servers providing service to 
𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖 run Algorithm 2 as shown above. To provide re-ciphering service to 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖, the 𝑚 servers 
require ℎ𝑜𝑚_𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣.  . Hence, the 𝑚 servers wait until at least other 𝑘 − 𝑚 proxy servers provide 
Algorithm 2 
Secure retrieval of IoT device key  
 
Where: ‘m’ proxy servers providing service to 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖  
Input: key shares 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖=(𝐸𝑖 , 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑦𝑖) 
Output: reconstructed encrypted key hom_𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣 
  
1. Pool m shares : 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠1 , 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠2, … 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚     
2. Request 𝑛 − 𝑚 servers to contribute shares  
3. Wait until at least 𝑘 − 𝑚 shares (𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚+1, 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑚+2, … 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑘)  are received  
4. Reconstruct hom_𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣 using Krawczyk’s scheme: 
 Reconstruct 𝐸 using interpolation 
 Reconstruct 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑦 using Lagrange’s interpolation  
 Decrypt 𝐸 using ChaCha20 encryption with 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑦  
  hom_𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣 =  𝐷𝑒𝑐(𝐸, 𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑦) 
5.  Store hom_𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣 with 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖 
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their shares 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑗 , 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑘 − 𝑚   . When at least 𝑘 shares are pooled, each proxy server 
independently reconstructs ℎ𝑜𝑚_𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣 with Krawczyk’s reconstruction scheme. The current 
study utilize the libraries from literature ([88]) to reconstruct ℎ𝑜𝑚_𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣. After executing 
Algorithm 2, the 𝑚 proxy servers have hom_𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣 for 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖.  
 
 
Phase III: Data flow 
At this stage 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑 becomes functional and is ready to use. The device begins to 
record data (let’s call it 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 ) and encrypts it using an encryption scheme (let’s say 𝐸𝑛𝑐)  
and 𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣. Upon encryption, 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑 transmits the encrypted data securely to the gateway 
device. When a proxy server receives the encrypted IoT device data from the gateway device, 
it is required to transform the ciphertext from 𝐸𝑛𝑐 scheme to FHE scheme. This is possible by 
exploiting the homomorphic property of the FHE scheme. Additional details are discussed in 
[62] . The following paragraphs aim to explain the implementation of this homomorphic 
property for the current study.  
For the sake of explanation, let us call the encrypted data transmitted by the IoT device 
as 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎′ . Then 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎′ = 𝐸𝑛𝑐 (𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎, 𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣).  According to homomorphic property of FHE, for 
any function 𝑓:  
𝑓 (𝐻𝐸𝑝𝑘 (𝑥), 𝐻𝐸𝑝𝑘 (𝑦)) = 𝐻𝐸𝑝𝑘((𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦)) 
Where, 𝐻𝐸𝑝𝑘  () represents the fully homomorphic encryption under the public 
key 𝑝𝑘. 
Substituting 𝑓 = 𝐷𝑒𝑐, 𝑥 = 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎’ and 𝑦 = 𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣  to evaluate a decryption function 𝐷𝑒𝑐 
corresponding to the encryption scheme 𝐸𝑛𝑐, produces:  
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𝐿𝐻𝑆 =  𝐷𝑒𝑐 (𝐻𝐸𝑝𝑘 (𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎′), 𝐻𝐸𝑝𝑘 (𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣)) => 𝐷𝑒𝑐(𝐻𝐸𝑝𝑘 (𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎, 𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣)), hom_𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣) 
𝑅𝐻𝑆 = 𝐻𝐸𝑝𝑘(𝐷𝑒𝑐(𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎
′, 𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣)) => 𝐻𝐸𝑝𝑘(𝐷𝑒𝑐(𝐸𝑛𝑐 (𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎, 𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣), 𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣)) 
The RHS equation is 𝐻𝐸𝑝𝑘(𝐷𝑒𝑐(𝐸𝑛𝑐 (𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎, 𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣), 𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣)) , where the value within the 
parenthesis of 𝐻𝐸𝑝𝑘 (… ) 𝑖𝑠  𝐷𝑒𝑐(𝐸𝑛𝑐 (𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎, 𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣), 𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣) . This is a standard decryption 
function, yielding 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 as the output. Thus, it can be inferred that 𝑅𝐻𝑆 = 𝐻𝐸𝑝𝑘(𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎). Now, 
equating LHS and RHS gives:  
𝐷𝑒𝑐(𝐻𝐸𝑝𝑘 (𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎, 𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣)), hom_𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣) = 𝐻𝐸𝑝𝑘(𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎) 
The above equations play a vital role in the current application as it explains that in 
order to transform 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 encrypted by 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑 using 𝐸𝑛𝑐 with 𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣 to a FHE scheme at the 
proxy server, the proxy server is required to perform i) homomorphic encryption of 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑 
generated ciphertext 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎’ = 𝐸𝑁𝐶(𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎, 𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣) with 𝑝𝑘 and a ii) homomorphic evaluation of 
decryption function 𝐷𝑒𝑐 corresponding to 𝐸𝑛𝑐 with hom_𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣.Thus the computational 
overhead of proxy servers that affects the system parameters like utilization, throughput etc., 
depends on the cost of homomorphic encryption of  𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎’ and homomorphic evaluation of 
𝐷𝑒𝑐 . 
AES encryption in CTR mode is used as 𝐸𝑛𝑐 scheme for the IoT device. This is chosen 
after comparing the performance of homomorphic evaluation of AES encryption in block 
cipher mode and stream cipher mode as explained in detail in Chapter 5.1. Although usage of 
stream ciphers instead of AES encryption in the stream cipher mode might give better 
performance, AES encryption is still chosen so that existing real-world implementations[65], 
especially the operational devices can adopt the proposed solution without requiring major 
changes.   
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Two key points to note when using AES encryption in the counter mode compared to 
block cipher mode are   
i) The decryption function in CTR mode involves i) an encryption the counter values to 
generate a key stream and ii) a XOR operation of the keystream with the ciphertext. It 
is important to make advantage of this fact, because homomorphic evaluation of 
decryption function is typically slower (60% slower in [73]) than the homomorphic 
evaluation of the encryption function. Hence, with AES encryption in counter mode, it 
is enough to encrypt the counter values using homomorphic encryption scheme and 
XOR the homomorphic ciphertext with the device generated ciphertext, to transform 
the data from AES scheme to FHE scheme.  
ii) The decryption function described above can be distinctly separated into two stages, a 
device-data dependent stage and a device-data independent stage, owing to its inherent 
construction mechanism. Typically, AES encryption is not computationally intensive 
for cloud servers that have abundant resources and specialized hardware. Hence this 
division is typically not mandatory. However, when performing a homomorphic 
evaluation of AES, it is critical to take advantage of this feature as it greatly improves 
the throughput of proxy servers, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Algorithm 3. Re-ciphering during data flow 
  
When the proxy server receives AES ciphertext 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎’ from the gateway device, it runs 
Algorithm 3 shown above to transform 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎’ from AES scheme to FHE scheme. As discussed 
above, offline phase is the data independent phase and can be processed by the proxy servers 
before receiving 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎’. This is possible because, in most IoT applications, the synchronization 
interval between the IoT device and the servers are pre-defined [68]. During the online 
processing phase, the proxy server transforms 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎’ from AES-CTR scheme to FHE scheme 
by adding the homomorphic keystream 𝐻𝐸𝑝𝑘(𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟) with the encoded ciphertext 
Algorithm 3 
Proxy re-ciphering  
Where: Cloud Proxy server   
Input: AES encrypted data 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎’ =  𝐸𝑛𝑐(𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎,   𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣)  
Output: Homomorphic encrypted data  
 
 Offline pre-processing:  
1. Fetch homomorphic encrypted key for 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖  :  hom_𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣  
2. Generate Homomorphic key stream using [3]: 
          𝐻𝐸𝑝𝑘(𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟) ≔ HE-𝐴𝐸𝑆 (𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟, hom_𝑘𝑑𝑒𝑣) 
 
 Online processing:  
1.  Encode AES encrypted data as homomorphic plaintext 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎′ 
2.  XOR homomorphic encoded AES data with homomorphic encrypted keystream:   
𝐻𝐸𝑝𝑘(𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎) ≔𝐹𝐻𝐸𝐴𝑑𝑑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡(𝐻𝐸𝑝𝑘(𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟), 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎′ ) 
3. Store 𝐻𝐸𝑝𝑘(𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎) in cloud compute DB 
4. Delete 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎’ 
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𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎′. The operations are performed in the current study are in Galois Field 𝐺𝐹(2) 
[62], [89] and hence a XOR operation is equivalent to an addition. After executing Algorithm3, 
the proxy server uploads the IoT device data encrypted under homomorphic encryption scheme 
𝐻𝐸𝑝𝑘(𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎) , to the cloud servers, for secure computation. Optionally, if required, the proxy 
server can upload the metadata for IoT device’s original ciphertext  𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎’ to the cloud storage 
DB server, for auditing/logging. 
Understandably, transforming every raw device data into homomorphic ciphertexts at 
the proxy servers can cause concerns about blow-up in the storage and bandwidth for cloud 
service providers. However, sharing homomorphic ciphertexts actively discourages cloud 
service providers from long-term storage of large amounts of raw device data, unnecessarily. 
Instead, it prompts the application developers to a) transform the raw homomorphic ciphertexts 
received from the proxy servers into a secondary useful knowledge/context that has minimal, 
yet adequate information required for the application and b) delete the rest of the raw data. In 
fact, studies like [110]- [111] have shown that end-user acceptance of IoT applications increase 
with continuous purging of raw device data by the service providers.  
  
Phase IV: Dynamic key refresh  
This is an additional phase that is initiated when i) a device compromise is detected 
where an adversary learns about the device encryption keys or ii) at a pre-defined frequency 
(6 months, 1 year etc.) to regularly refresh the encryption keys used by a device.  
Unlike typical client-client or client-server key exchange protocols, the keys required 
for the current study are not ephemeral keys (like session keys) but are long-term secure device 
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specific encryption keys, between two known entities. Such a key refresh protocol is typically 
expected to guarantee the following properties:   
• Uniqueness: the encryption keys should be unique for every device – KMS pair 
• Correctness: the encryption keys should be correctly synchronized between the IoT device 
and KMS  
• Security: the encryption keys should not be shared over the wireless channel 
• Randomness: the encryption keys should have high entropy  
• Post-compromise secrecy: the advantage of an adversary with a stolen key in learning about 
future/newly generated data should be minimal 
• Latency: the communication complexity and the computation complexity should be 
minimal  
 The current work explores a new way of generating synchronized symmetric  
encryption keys with the help of chameleon hash functions [92]. Unlike regular hash functions 
, under specific conditions, Chameleon hash functions can produce hash collisions 
𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑀(𝑚1, ℎ𝑘, 𝑟1) = 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑀(𝑚2, ℎ𝑘, 𝑟2) , for 𝑚1, 𝑚2 ∈ 𝑍𝑞
∗  , 𝑚1 ≠ 𝑚2 and 𝑟1, 𝑟2 ∈ 𝑍𝑞
∗ where 
ℎ𝑘 is the hashing key,. To generate a collision, chameleon hash functions require knowledge 
of a special trapdoor key 𝑥, such that manipulating the values of 𝑟1, 𝑟2 using:  𝑟2 ≔
 
𝑚1+𝑥.𝑟1−𝑚2
𝑥
 𝑞 can guarantee 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑀(𝑚1, ℎ𝑘, 𝑟1) = 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑀(𝑚2, ℎ𝑘, 𝑟2) [92]. 
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 The gateway device runs Algorithm 4  when it receives a key request from the device. The 
current work does not focus on implementing the logic to verify a key request. Libraries from 
literature ( [93] ) are used to generate chameleon hashes and chameleon collisions in 
Algorithms 4, 5 and 6.  The gateway generates a random id (𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑) using a computationally 
secure pseudo random generator (CSPRNG).The gateway XORs 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑 with 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑 for the 
IoT device to produce 𝑚1 = XOR( 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑,   𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑). It sets 𝑚2 =  𝐾𝑀𝑆𝑖𝑑 , where 𝐾𝑀𝑆𝑖𝑑 is 
the identifier for the KMS responsible for 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑. Thus for 𝑚1 ≠ 𝑚2,  the gateway device 
finds two random and independent values 𝑟1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟2, using the following equation :  
𝑟2 ≔  
𝑚1 + 𝑥. 𝑟1 − 𝑚2
𝑥
 𝑞 
 
 where 𝑥 is the trapdoor of the chameleon hash function (stored securely at the gateway) and 
𝑟2 is called the chameleon-collision [92]. 
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Algorithm 4. Finding chameleon collision at gateway 
 
 
 
Algorithm 4 
Finding chameleon collision at gateway  
Where: IoT gateway device  
Input: trapdoor key  𝑡𝑘 = 𝑥 ∈ 𝑍𝑞, 𝐾𝑀𝑆𝑖𝑑, 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑 , prime number 𝑞 such 
that 𝑝 = 𝑘𝑞 + 1 where p is random large prime number 
Output: Chameleon collision 𝑟2 
  
1.Verify key refresh request   
2. Generate a random number 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑 using CSPRNG  
3. One time pad the 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑 with 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑 , 𝑚1 = XOR( 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑,   𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑)   
4. Generate random number 𝑟1 for hashing 𝑚1 
5. Send 𝑟1  and 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑 to IoT device  
6.   Store 𝐾𝑀𝑆𝑖𝑑 as 𝑚2 
7.   Find a Chameleon collision 𝑟2 using  𝑚1 + 𝑥.  𝑟1 =  𝑚2 + 𝑥.  𝑟2 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞 
8.   Send  𝑟2 to KMS  
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Algorithm 5. Dynamic key generation at IoT device 
 
At the end of Algorithm 4 , the gateway device shares 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑 and 𝑟1 with the IoT device and 
𝑟2 with the KMS such that the IoT device and the KMS can run Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6 
respectively. After receiving 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑 , 𝑟1 from the gateway device, the IoT device runs 
Algorithm 5. At the end of the algorithm, the device generates a key (let’s call it 𝑘𝑒𝑦’) where 
𝑘𝑒𝑦’= 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑀(𝑚1, ℎ𝑘,  𝑟1) = 𝑔
𝑚1𝑦𝑟1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 . 
Algorithm 5 
 Dynamic key generation at IoT device  
Where: IoT device  
Input: random prime numbers 𝑝,  𝑞 such that 𝑝 = 𝑘𝑞 + 1 , 
hash key ℎ𝑘 = 𝑦 = 𝑔 𝑥𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 , random numbers 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑, 𝑟1 
Output: Chameleon hash as encryption key  
 
1. One-time pad of 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑with 𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒅_𝒊𝒅 to maintain 
entropy  
 𝑚1 = XOR( 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑,   𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑)  
2. Compute Chameleon hash using  [5] 
 𝑘𝑒𝑦’= 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑀(𝑚1, ℎ𝑘,  𝑟1) 
3. Store 𝒌𝒆𝒚’ as encryption key  
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Algorithm 6. Dynamic key generation at KMS 
 
After receiving 𝑟2 from gateway, KMS runs Algorithm 6 and generates a key (let’s 
call it 𝑘𝑒𝑦’’) 
𝑘𝑒𝑦’’= 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑀(𝑚2, ℎ𝑘, 𝑟2) = 𝑔
𝑚2𝑦𝑟2 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 . 
By the property of chameleon collision[92] using trapdoor, it can be inferred that the 
key generated by the IoT device( 𝑘𝑒𝑦’) and the KMS (𝑘𝑒𝑦’’) are the same. 
𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑀(𝑚1, ℎ𝑘, 𝑟1) = 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑀(𝑚2, ℎ𝑘, 𝑟2) 
After generating the new device key, the KMS runs Algorithm 1 once again, to the 
encrypt the new device key under homomorphic scheme and distribute the key shares to the 
proxy servers.  This is one of the salient features of the current work as it enables the system 
to continue Phase III-data flow phase, even post compromise. Chapter 5 discusses the security 
properties of this phase in more detail.   
Algorithm 6 
 Dynamic key generation at KMS  
Where: KMS  
Input: random prime numbers 𝑝,  𝑞 such that 𝑝 = 𝑘𝑞 + 1 , hash 
key ℎ𝑘 = 𝑦 = 𝑔𝑥𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 , random numbers 𝑟2 
Output: Chameleon hash as encryption key  
 
1. Store UUID of server 𝐾𝑀𝑆𝑖𝑑 as 𝑚2 
 𝑚2=𝐾𝑀𝑆𝑖𝑑 
2. Compute Chameleon hash using [5] 
  𝑘𝑒𝑦’’= 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑀(𝑚2, ℎ𝑘, 𝑟2) 
3.Store 𝑘𝑒𝑦’ as encryption key  
 4. Run Algorithm 1  
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CHAPTER 4.    CASE STUDY: SMART HEALTHCARE 
This Chapter focuses on the need for secure and privacy preserving cloud computations 
for a specific real-world IoT application: smart healthcare.  First, the chapter discusses the 
importance of IoT and cloud computing for quality medical assistance. Finally, the chapter 
discusses how Proxy re-ciphering as a service can help healthcare organizations benefit from 
cloud computing without compromising their patient privacy for IoT device data, with minimal 
overhead.  
4.1 Internet of Things in Healthcare  
IoT market has been witnessing a steady increase in demand and investment for 
healthcare services that prioritize improving the quality of living, by shifting focus from 
diagnosis and treatment to monitoring and prevention. Smart healthcare applications, which 
are an integral part of IoT-healthcare, combine embedded medical devices that record vital 
signs and communicate them to the cloud servers, allowing remote medical assistance and care.  
Continuous glucose monitoring [94], insulin pens [95], smart inhalers [96] and ingestible 
sensors [97] are some examples of smart healthcare products that promise to improve people 
all over the world. Thus, it comes as no surprise that IoT-healthcare market has a projected 
value of 348 Billion USD by 2025 [98].  
In June 2018, a report of a clinical trial consisting of 357 patients undergoing head and 
neck cancer treatment was presented at the American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO) 
Annual meeting. The report compared the effects of treatment and the severity of symptoms 
witnessed by two groups of patients. The first group consisted of patients (169 people) that 
used a Bluetooth powered weight scale and a blood pressure cuffs with a symptom tracking 
app, called CYCORE, with daily updates to their physicians. The second group followed the 
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traditional way of treatment with regular weekly visits to their physician, without any 
additional monitoring [99]. At the end of the trial, it was identified that the first group showed 
better improvement to their treatment and experienced less severe symptoms along the way, 
compared to the latter.  
In 2013, it was estimated that incomplete medical histories and insufficient/lack of 
patient data contributed to 400,000 deaths a year [100]. Furthermore, American Cancer Society 
estimated that around 51540 new head and neck cancers will be diagnosed in 2018, with over 
10000 fatalities [101]. These alarming numbers, along with the report presented at the ASCO 
annual meeting compel the necessity to shift towards the digital healthcare era where medical 
IoT devices can help improve the quality of assistance, even for chronic conditions.  There is 
also a push from Government to digitize health record to improve interoperability of patient’s 
health record [102].  
In a digital healthcare world, an electronic medical record (EMR) is the equivalent of 
a patient’s medical record. It is maintained by a heath care provider and is updated constantly 
to include all relevant and important information like name, age, address, health concerns, 
administered medications and their dosages, vital signs and any laboratory reports. With Smart 
healthcare, an effort towards comprehensive medical care thus includes continuous monitoring 
of patients’ vital signs from medical IoT devices and recording them as a part of EMR. Such 
an overarching medical data collection and processing can potentially provide new dimensions 
to a patient’s overall health profile, by the virtue of the enormous and continuous data recorded 
by the medical IoT devices.    
However, the adoption and transition towards digital healthcare world can be 
challenging and expensive for healthcare providers. Close to 25% executives from over 1800 
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hospitals associated transitioning cost as their primary concern while adapting to the digital 
era [103]. Cloud computing is a promising solution that can ease this transition for the 
healthcare organizations by allowing them to outsource the storage and processing of medical 
data to cloud vendors like Google Cloud Healthcare [104]. 
 
4.2 Smart Healthcare and Cloud  
Cloud service providers usually operate on pay-per-use model. Thus, offloading the 
storage and processing of medical records to the cloud servers can help healthcare 
organizations eliminate the need to maintain expensive data centers, hardware equipment and 
IT personnel. Cloud computing for healthcare is an active research topic, that aims to 
modernize US healthcare system [102]. 
Cloud-based smart heath care solutions typically involves three phases: 1) Data 
generation, where the medical data is recorded either manually by a physician/nurse or by a 
medical IoT device 2) Data storage, where the data collected from the patient is uploaded to a 
cloud storage service like Amazon S3, for future access 3) Data computation, where cloud 
applications process the data to extract intelligence from the stored data. To provide a holistic 
service, during phase 3, cloud service providers can potentially make use of data driven 
services like analytics and machine learning [104] to process the medical data coming from 
multiple sources (heart rate monitors, fitness bands, EMR, insulin pumps etc.) and correlate 
the data points, for a patient. Such a technique can provide a comprehensive view about the 
patient’s overall health. The availability of such multi-faceted medical reports can help doctors 
deliver high quality medical assistance to their patients. To this end, in 2018, Fitbit acquired a 
company named Twine Health and announced a collaboration with Google cloud to combine 
Fitbit data with EMR aiming to accelerate innovation in digital health [105]. Twine health has 
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proven to help people manage chronic conditions like diabetes and hypertension with their 
remote health coaching platform[106].  
 
4.3 Security for Healthcare  
In 2017, the healthcare industry witnessed twice as many attacks as any other industry 
[107] , forcing healthcare providers to improve their cybersecurity hygiene. The Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) has also laid down rules and regulations 
to prevent Personal Health Information (PHI) from misuse. PHI almost same as EMR but are 
primarily designed to be used by patients, while the latter is primarily designed to be used by 
healthcare providers. PHI and EMR are valuable in the underground black market since an 
identity theft from medical data gives a perpetrator the chance to receive health care through 
channels like Medicare, buy pharmaceuticals and commit insurance fraud. In 2016, FBI 
estimated that health information is valued close to $60-$70 on the black market while a Social 
security number is valued close to $1 in the same underground market [108]. Figure 6 shows 
an overview of the number of complaints due to medical identity theft issues from 2013-2017 
across different states in the US [109]. It becomes imperative to make sure that PHI/EMR is 
secure and protected against data breaches and leakage.  
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Figure 6. Overview of complaints regarding medical identity thefts from 2013-2017 [110] 
 
A natural concern for healthcare organizations when outsourcing medical data to cloud 
service providers is protecting patients’ privacy. In addition, consumers are concerned that 
small privacy invasions by cloud service providers may eventually result in loss of civil 
rights[73]. As discussed in Chapter 1, encrypting the medical data before outsourcing them to 
cloud can assuage these concerns. However, as explained in Chapter 2, this precludes cloud 
service providers from performing any meaningful computations on the medical data. FHE 
schemes can address this concern, but as explained in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, there are 
limitations in the works so far proposed in the literature which can inhibit real-world adoption 
of FHE schemes for healthcare industry.  
 4.4 Proxy re-ciphering as a service for Healthcare IoT 
In this section, we will consider a realistic scenario to explain the deployment of the 
proposed framework in a health care service provider company. Here we will focus on a 
healthcare company that provides healthcare assistance to hundreds of thousands of patients 
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across US. Consider a situation where they have been witnessing an exponential growth in the 
number of remote health monitoring devices like ECG monitors, smart inhalers, defibrillators 
etc., among their patients. This healthcare provider realizes that delivering a quality assistance 
to patients will require them to evaluate the overall healthcare profile of each patient and this 
includes in-house data about vital signs created manually by nurses and those received from 
the medical IoT devices. The executive management team along with IT department personnel 
at the company will have to evaluate the options they have in order to address this situation:   
1. Solution A: Invest in a bigger in-house datacenter. This requires them to invest in 
additional hardware equipment’s, procure land space, and hire more IT personnel to 
tackle the installation and maintenance.  
2. Solution B: Utilize cloud service providers to store encrypted patient data.  
While solution A guarantees data security and privacy, it can quickly reach bottlenecks, 
since it is not a scalable solution. While solution 2 guarantees data security and privacy, the 
solution cannot provide privacy-preserving data insights that healthcare providers require, for 
quality assistance. 
Contoso Inc., a (fictional) third-party company, can use the proposed framework to 
provide Proxy re-ciphering as a service as shown in Figure 7 . Contoso Inc. promises to act as 
a secure intermediary between hospitals across US like the healthcare service provider 
company considered in this scenario and their cloud service providers. Contoso guarantees that 
it can securely enable health care providers to use the cutting-edge cloud technologies from 
the hospital’s choice of cloud service provider with a modest overhead to the hospital and to 
its patients. Under these circumstances, solution B is certainly a viable option for the healthcare 
organizations to benefit from cloud computing while preserving the privacy of its patients.  
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Thus, the workflow can effectively have multifold gains for the end-users and businesses like 
the health care organization considered in this scenario :  
i. First, cloud service providers do not have access to raw device data, eliminating 
potential sharing and secondary usage of the device data. 
ii. Second, a device key compromise or revocation does not render data in the cloud 
vulnerable and does not require rekeying [53] of the entire past data. This is because, 
the secondary and processed homomorphic data in the cloud servers are transparent to 
the encryption key used by the devices. In addition, a device key refresh operation to 
protect future data does not affect the functionality of the cloud servers or the 
information stored by them. 
iii. Finally, with cloud servers storing the processed homomorphic context derived from 
the raw device data, the storage blow-up can be minimized to an acceptable overhead. 
This can in turn foster real-world adoption of FHE based solutions by the cloud service 
provider thereby enabling more users and businesses.  
 
In a nutshell, when cloud providers only store a minimally required homomorphic data 
derived based on application logic from the raw device data, end-users can be comfortable 
about not losing data control to the cloud service providers and can be confident that their 
device data is secure throughout its lifecycle. A past raw device data is not rendered vulnerable 
with a key compromise since the service providers store only the derived data encrypted under 
the homomorphic scheme. In addition, by the virtue of key refresh, a newly generated device 
data cannot be decrypted by an attacker with the stolen past keys. Chapter 5 discusses the 
security properties of the framework in greater detail. 
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Figure 7. An example of proxy re-ciphering as a service framework for smart healthcare 
 
4.5 Deployment Scenarios  
Studies like [73] have shown that end-users are concerned about the usage of their data, 
with 89% of the surveyed consumers expressing discomfort with third party service providers 
accessing their information without consent and with 72% feeling that sharing their personal 
information may have more demerits than benefits. The sample narrative mentioned in the 
previous section considers a deployment scenario where Proxy re-ciphering as a service is 
entirely managed by a third-party company named Contoso Inc. However, the service can be 
hosted by different entities and this section discusses their merits and demerits. The current 
study identifies four different deployment scenarios: 
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1. The KMS, the distributed proxy servers and the cloud servers are hosted by three 
different companies as discussed in previous section. For example, KMS could be 
hosted by Fitbit Inc., distributed proxy servers could be hosted by Contoso Inc. 
(mentioned earlier), and cloud servers could be hosted by Microsoft Azure.  
2. The KMS and the proxy servers are hosted by the same company while cloud servers 
are hosted by a different company.  
3. The distributed proxy servers and the cloud servers are hosted by the same company 
while the KMS is hosted by a different company.  
4. The KMS, the distributed proxy servers and the cloud servers are all hosted by the 
same company.  
An ideal workflow will be one where a customer does not have to trust any service 
providers (KMS/ proxy server/ cloud server) with their data and yet receive privacy preserving 
services. In the current work KMS manages the device encryption keys, the proxy servers store 
the homomorphic device encryption keys and the public key of the recipient and the cloud 
servers have access to the public key of the recipient. Thus, the following section views each 
entity as a potential adversary from an end-user’s perspective and lays out the merits and 
demerits of each scenario.    
Scenario 1 
 If the KMS, proxy servers and the cloud servers do not collude, no entity has enough 
information to decrypt the device data.  The bandwidth required to share device encryption key 
shares from KMS to the proxy servers can be high, but this is a one-time cost. The bandwidth 
required to share homomorphic data from proxy servers to cloud servers can be high depending 
on the location of the servers.  
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This can be a recommended scenario since it is privacy preserving, however the 
communication latency during data flow phase can be high if the proxy servers and cloud 
servers are in different regions.   
Scenario 2 
The KMS and proxy servers can together decrypt the device data. This is because, 
proxy servers receive the encrypted device data and the KMS have the access to the device 
keys. The bandwidth required to share the device encryption keys can be reduced with this 
configuration. The bandwidth required to share the homomorphic ciphertext from the proxy 
servers to the cloud servers can be high depending on the location of the servers.  
This is not a recommended scenario since this requires the end users to fully trust the company 
hosting KMS and the proxy servers.   
Scenario 3 
If the KMS does not collude the company hosting proxy servers and cloud servers, no 
entity has enough information to decrypt the device data. The bandwidth required to share 
device encryption key shares from KMS to the proxy servers can be high, but this is a one-
time cost. The bandwidth required to share homomorphic data from proxy servers to cloud 
servers can be reduced with this configuration. If proxy servers remain semi-honest and do not 
store the device encrypted data, a device key compromise do not render device data vulnerable.  
This is a recommended scenario since it protects users’ privacy with reduced latency during 
data flow phase. 
Scenario 4 
The company hosting all the services (the KMS, the distributed proxy servers and the 
cloud servers) has a complete control over the device data and thus can decrypt or store the 
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raw data, as required. The bandwidth required to share device encryption key shares from KMS 
to the proxy servers can be reduced with this configuration. The bandwidth required to share 
homomorphic ciphertext from the proxy servers to the cloud servers can be reduced with this 
configuration.  
However, this requires an end-user to completely trust the service provider and hence is not 
recommended. 
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CHAPTER 5.    PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
This chapter focuses on evaluating the feasibility and utility of the conceptualized 
system model in the real-world by applying it to the case study performed in Chapter 4. First, 
the chapter discusses the performance observed using an experimental testbed. Later, the 
chapter presents the security properties of the framework theoretically.   
 
5.1 Experimental Evaluation  
5.1.1 Experimental Setup  
A basic IoT testbed was developed to simulate the problem scenario explained in the 
previous chapter. The testbed architecture consists of a gateway device, the distributed proxy 
servers, the cloud server, the end-user device and the KMS.   The following platforms were 
used for the implementation: i) Android Google pixel 2 emulator with 2 GB RAM as a gateway 
device ii) Dual core 8 GB Ubuntu 14.04 LTS virtual machines (VM) hosted on Microsoft 
Azure as the proxy servers and the cloud compute server iii) Microsoft Azure blob storage as 
a backend storage for the cloud compute server and a iv) Single core 1GB Ubuntu 14.0 LTS 
VM hosted on Microsoft Azure as an end-user device and the KMS.  
The current study uses ECG records from TELE ECG Database [110] and activity 
records from FITBIT [111] servers as the medical IoT data source. An android app running on 
the google pixel emulator acts both as a medical IoT device and as a gateway. The app fetches 
the data from the databases and encrypts them using AES encryption in the counter mode 
before sending it to the proxy servers. The former database consists of ECG data recorded 
using TeleMedCare Health Monitor (TeleMedCare Pty. Ltd. Sydney, Australia). It consists of 
300 ECG single lead-I signal recordings where 250 of them were selected randomly from 120 
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patients and 50 of them were manually selected from 168 patients to include poor quality data 
in the sample population [110]. The sampling frequency for TELE database was 500 Hz with 
voltages ranging from 5.556912223578890 to -5.554198887532222 mV. Each record in the 
database is available as a comma separated value (CSV) file. Each line in the CSV file contains 
the ECG sample value in mV, among other values. The latter data source was generated using 
a Fitbit Charge 2 tracker. Fitbit APIs are available for developers and researchers to access 
data collected by Fitbit devices. However, access to intraday time series values are directly 
available only for personal use [111]. Among the several data points collected by the Fitbit 
device, the current study uses the endpoints for heart rate time series and daily activity time 
series. For example, the API request to get step values for a specific date with a 15-minute 
interval value will be: 𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑒𝐴𝑝𝑖𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡(“𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟/−𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠/𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝𝑠/𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒/” +
𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ_𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 + ”/1𝑑/15𝑚𝑖𝑛. 𝑗𝑠𝑜𝑛”); 
The current study uses the following libraries: HElib [57] , Archistar [88] ,  
CloudCrypto [93] and default Java crypto package to execute the algorithms discussed in 
chapter 3. The current study uses the default parameter values available in the libraries. 
However, when implementing a cloud-based application, depending on the application logic, 
the values of the parameters in the libraries should be chosen appropriately.  
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Figure 8. Experiment setup with high-level workflow 
 
Figure 8 aims to explain the interactions between various devices/platforms (mentioned 
above) within the proposed model.  
Phase I- Phase III 
The following steps correspond to the workflow shown in Figure 8. 
1. -VM in Block-D (KMS) encrypts the AES encryption key used by the Android device 
under BGV homomorphic encryption scheme using HElib library and distributes the 
Krawczyk’s shares generated using Archistar library to all the VMs running in Block-A 
(proxy servers) 
-VMs in Block-A (proxy servers) communicate with each other to reconstruct 
homomorphic encrypted Android device key from the Krawczyk’s shares using Archistar 
library 
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2. Android emulator (acting as medical device) fetches data from one of the databases and 
encrypts it using AES encryption in CTR mode using its device key  
3. Android emulator (acting as gateway) sends the AES encrypted data to a VM in Block-A 
4. -A VM in Block-A (proxy server) receiving the ciphertext (from step 3) transforms the 
ciphertext from AES encryption scheme to FHE scheme by evaluating the homomorphic 
decryption function with off-line pre-processing using HElib  
-The VM uploads the homomorphic encrypted ciphertext to Azure blob storage (Block-B). 
-A VMs in Block-B (cloud servers) performs privacy-preserving computation on the data 
in blob storage <not implemented in the current study> 
5. A VM in Block-C (end user) requests result of computation (performed in step 4). from the 
VM in Block-B  
6. -VM in Block-B shares homomorphic encrypted result to VM in Block-C  
-VM in Block-C decrypts the homomorphic results using its private key and views the 
plaintext result  
Phase IV 
The following steps are not shown in Figure 8 for simplicity.  
7. Android emulator (acting as gateway) shares a random number with VM in Block-D 
(KMS)  
8. Android emulator (acting as medical device) and the VM in Block-D execute chameleon 
hash function using CloudCrypto library to generate a dynamic encryption key. 
 
5.1.2 Performance Evaluation  
The current system uses a distributed proxy framework primarily to overcome the loss 
of availability of service and loss/corruption of device keys in the proxy servers. Since the 
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system stores homomorphic encrypted shares of keys instead of the actual keys, confidentiality 
of the encryption keys is guaranteed. The parameters used in the key sharing model are 𝑚, 𝑘, 𝑛 , 
where, 𝑚 is the number of proxy servers providing service to a healthcare organization, 𝑘 is 
the threshold or the minimum number of proxy servers required to reconstruct the 
homomorphic encryption key for every device and 𝑛 is the total number of proxy servers 
available in a given geographical region. The relation between these parameters are 𝑚 < 𝑘 <
𝑛 in the system and more specifically we require that 𝑛 − 𝑚 ≥ 𝑘. This guarantees system 
resiliency which is explained in Chapter 5.2. In the following experiments, all the traffic 
generated by medical devices belonging to a specific healthcare organization are handled by a 
single proxy server (𝑚 = 1). < 𝑘, 𝑛 > are the tunable system parameters. Hence, the important 
aspects of the problem: values for <  𝑘, 𝑛 >  and its impact on the performance are first studied.  
The threshold sharing scheme says that, the difficulty in collapsing a system is directly 
proportional to the value of 𝑛, for a given value of 𝑘.  It is implied from Krawczyk’s scheme 
that the size of the shares distributed to each proxy server is inversely proportional to the value 
of 𝑘. Thus, it is desirable to have larger values for  𝑛, 𝑘 as they provide better security and 
storage complexity. However, it is essential to analyze the impact of 𝑘, 𝑛 on the computational 
and communication latency, before finalizing the values.  Both these latencies are calculated 
at the KMS as well as at the proxy server. The computational latency is calculated at the KMS 
based on the time taken to construct the key shares and at the proxy server it is based on the 
time taken to re-construct the key after receiving the shares. The communication latency at the 
KMS is defined as the time taken to distribute the shares to 𝑛 proxy servers, and at a proxy 
server, it is defined as the time taken to receive 𝑘 − 1 shares for reconstruction. Since the exact 
impact of 𝑘, 𝑛 on the above-mentioned latencies is not clearly evident, it is analyzed using the 
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testbed. The evaluation consists of a series of experiments conducted with 10 trials. Each trial 
consists of generating a 128-bit AES key and encrypting it under homomorphic scheme. The 
performance of computation and communication latency is observed for values of  𝑛 =
 5,7,9,11,13,15. The reason for choosing odd values of 𝑛 is explained in Chapter 5.2. For every 
value of 𝑛 , the performance is tested for different values of 𝑘, to understand the behavior of 
the system. For the purpose of this experiment, the clock in all the servers were synchronized 
to Central Standard Time. Any clock skews or differences in the clock synchronization is 
negligible and hence is ignored for the calculation purposes.  
 
Effect of  threshold secret sharing parameters  <k,n> on the total latency during key 
distribution at KMS  
The first evaluation comprises of analyzing the time taken at the KMS to distribute the 
IoT device key encrypted under the homomorphic scheme. The total time taken at the KMS is 
the sum of the computation latency and communication latency, as explained earlier. Figure 9 
shows the behavior of the total time for various values of < 𝑘, 𝑛 >. It is observed that for a 
given value of 𝑛, as the value of 𝑘 is increased, the computational latency increases. However, 
it is also observed that as the value of 𝑘 increases, the size of each share decreases. Thus, the 
communication latency decreases. Since the communication latency is much higher than the 
computation latency, it is observed that as the value of 𝑘 increases, for a given value of 𝑛, the 
overall time taken reduces. Along the same lines, it is observed that, for a given value of 𝑘,  as 
the value of 𝑛 increases, there is an overall increase in the size of the data (𝑛. (
|𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎|
𝑘
+ |𝐾𝑒𝑦|)) 
that is distributed. Thus, increasing the value of 𝑛 results in an overall increase in the time 
taken.  
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Figure 9. Evaluation of latency to distribute Krawczyk’s shares of homomorphic encrypted 
device key 
 
Effect of threshold secret sharing parameters <k,n> on the total latency during 
reconstruction at Proxy server  
Next, the total latency to reconstruct the homomorphic key at a proxy server is studied. 
The total latency is the sum of communication latency and computational latency for the proxy 
server. From Figure 10 it can be observed that when the value of 𝑘 increases, the 
communication latency increases. This is because, a proxy server needs 𝑘 − 1 server shares to 
reconstruct a device key, and thus when the value of 𝑘 increases, total amount of shares/data 
required for reconstruction increases, thus increasing the communication latency. Also, from 
the experiments it was observed that increasing the value of 𝑘 and 𝑛 increases the computation 
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time to reconstruct the homomorphic key. Thus, the total latency, which is a sum of the two 
latencies, increases as the values of 𝑘 and 𝑛 are increased. 
 
 
Figure 10. Evaluation of latency at each proxy server for homomorphic key 
reconstruction 
 
Comparison of Krawczyk’s computational secret sharing vs Shamir’s perfect secret 
sharing during key distribution at KMS 
Next, the study evaluates the merits and limitations of Krawczyk’s, and Shamir’s secret 
sharing scheme and explains the rationale behind the choice made in the current study. Figure 
11 shows the latency at the KMS when using Shamir’s scheme instead of Krawczyk’s, during 
key distribution. It is observed that as the value 𝑜𝑓 𝑘 increases, the computation latency 
increases. It is also observed that as the value of 𝑛 increases, the communication latency 
increases. This may be because, when 𝑘 increases, the size of the secret polynomial increases 
and when 𝑛 increases the number of shares (and thus the total size of data transmitted) 
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increases.  Hence, the overall latency which is a sum of the two latencies increases as the value 
of 𝑘, 𝑛 are increased.  Given that the frequency of key distribution operation is not high in the 
current framework, the latency overhead of Shamir’s scheme compared to Krawczyk’s may 
not be significant. However, in the current study, the secret that is shared is the AES device 
key encrypted under the homomorphic scheme. The default parameter values in HElib library 
yielded a homomorphic encrypted AES key of size close to 3MB, for a 128-bit AES device 
key.  Thus, when storing a homomorphic encrypted key share compared to the actual key, 
Shamir’s scheme experiences a memory expansion of close to 
𝑛.|𝐻𝑜𝑚−𝑘𝑒𝑦|
|𝑘𝑒𝑦|
=
 𝑛.|𝐻𝑜𝑚−𝑘𝑒𝑦|
|𝑘𝑒𝑦|
≅
𝑛.
3.2x106𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠
16 𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠
≅ 𝑛. 105 . Compared to this,  Krawczyk’s scheme witnesses a memory expansion 
of close to  
𝑛.(
|𝐻𝑜𝑚−𝑘𝑒𝑦|
𝑘
+|𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑦|)
|𝑘𝑒𝑦|
= 𝑛.
 |𝐻𝑜𝑚−𝑘𝑒𝑦|
𝑘
+|𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑦|
|𝑘𝑒𝑦|
≅
3.2x106
𝑘
+16  𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠
16 𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠
≅
𝑛.105
𝑘
 . Thus, for higher values 
of 𝑘, Krawczyk’s scheme provides better storage efficiency.   This is the reason why despite 
its merits regarding perfect security, Krawczyk’s scheme was chosen over Shamir’s scheme 
for the threshold secret sharing scheme.   
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Figure 11. Evaluation of latency to distribute Shamir’s shares of homomorphic encrypted 
device key 
 
Trade-off between privacy and latency in encryption schemes 
Next, the study evaluates the computation cost of using fully homomorphic encryption 
schemes compared to the traditional schemes. To do this, the current study chooses 4 
approaches that allow cloud servers to compute on the IoT data: 1) share device data without 
encryption , 2)share device data encrypted under AES scheme in block cipher mode such that 
it can be decrypted using AES and re-encrypted using a fully homomorphic encryption scheme 
, 3) share device data encrypted under AES scheme in block cipher mode and  perform 
homomorphic evaluation the AES decryption 4) share data encrypted under AES scheme in 
stream cipher mode and perform homomorphic evaluation the AES decryption. The total 
latency measured is the sum of time taken to send a 32-byte data from the Android emulator 
to the proxy server VM and the time taken at the proxy server VM to prepare the data for cloud 
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computation.  Figure 12 displays the total time taken during each approach. The current study 
explains the observed behavior below.  
 
Figure 12. Evaluation of privacy vs latency trade-off for encryption schemes 
 
The first approach is to share the data in the plaintext form, i.e. without any encryption. 
This is the most naïve (although not recommended) solution for constrained IoT devices. A 
communication cost of 1ms is observed to send the data. Since the data is immediately 
available for computation, time taken to transform the data at the proxy server is 0ms. Thus, 
the total time taken is 1ms. The second approach is to share device data encrypted under AES 
scheme. A communication cost of 1ms is observed to send the data. A computation cost of 2ms 
is observed for AES decryption function and a cost of 5ms is observed for homomorphic 
encryption of the plaintext device data.  Thus, a total cost of 8ms is observed to make the data 
computation-ready. The third approach is to encrypt the device data under AES scheme in 
block cipher mode. A communication cost of 1ms is observed to send the data. A computation 
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cost of 2302ms is observed to perform the homomorphic evaluation of the AES decryption 
function in block cipher mode. After this, the data is computation-ready. Thus, a total time of 
2303ms is observed. The last approach encrypts the device data under AES scheme using 
counter mode. A total communication cost of 1ms is observed to send the data. A computation 
cost of 1552ms is observed for the homomorphic evaluation of AES decryption function in the 
counter mode. After this, the data is computation-ready. Thus, a total time of 1553ms is 
observed. HElib library currently provides implementation for AES evaluation in block cipher 
mode. The current study utilizes HElib and extends it to evaluate AES evaluation in stream 
cipher mode.   
The current study now analyzes the trade-offs in these schemes. Although the first 
approach is the fastest, it can be noted that it is not privacy preserving and is not a good fit for 
this study. The second approach is the next best approach in terms of latency. However, it 
requires a fully trusted VM that stores the device key to decrypt the AES encrypted data, and 
thus, is not a suitable approach for the current study. The third and fourth approaches meet the 
requirement of this study. Thus, the fourth approach is chosen due to its lower latency 
requirement. 
Next, since the fourth approach utilizes stream cipher mode, it thus possible to separate 
the homomorphic evaluation of decryption function into two stages: offline and online as 
shown in Algorithm 3. This is from the inherent construction of AES encryption scheme in 
stream cipher mode.  
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Figure 13. Evaluation of privacy vs latency trade-off for encryption schemes – with offline 
pre-processing 
 
Figure 13 shows the performance of the proxy server with offline pre-processing 
capability. A computation cost of 1548ms is observed during the offline stage for the 
homomorphic AES encryption of the counter values. During the online stage, a communication 
cost of 1ms is observed for the encrypted device data to reach the proxy server and a 
computation cost of 4ms is observed for the homomorphic decryption of the AES data. Thus, 
a total online (after data is sent out) cost of 5ms is observed. This is a huge reduction in the 
total cost, which increases the throughput from 0.66 operations/ms to 250 operations/ms for 
the proxy server. Here, an operation is defined as the process of homomorphic evaluation of 
AES decryption function to transform device data from AES encryption scheme to 
homomorphic encryption scheme.  
 
Effect of data size on throughput at proxy server  
Next, the current study evaluates the time taken (with offline pre-processing) at the 
proxy server, during a data-flow phase with the real-world data. The current study assumes 
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that the offline homomorphic AES encryption of the counter values is always pre-computed 
and available. To perform this test, data from TELE ECG database is downloaded to the 
Android device. The performance is evaluated for sampling frequencies 𝑓 =
100𝐻𝑧, 200 𝐻𝑧, 300 𝐻𝑧, 400𝐻𝑧, 500𝐻𝑧 , since these frequencies were identified to be most 
widely used by ECG devices. Figure 14 shows the performance of the above-mentioned test. 
Client-side encryption refers to the time taken at the android device to encrypt the data using 
AES encryption in counter mode. The current study utilizes the standard java crypto package 
for the evaluation. Transformation at proxy indicates the total time taken at a proxy server VM 
to evaluate the homomorphic decryption function of the encrypted data, with offline pre-
processing.  It is observed that for a sampling frequency of 500Hz (sampling frequency used 
in TELE ECG database), it takes 712ms to transform the data at the proxy server. This means 
that after receiving the data from the Android device, the proxy server VM can prepare the 
data for computation close to 700ms. The overhead of 700ms for a long term patient monitoring 
services like [99] can be acceptable, since they do not require real-time updates.  
 
Figure 14. Evaluation of latency for different ECG sampling frequencies 
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 Effect of CPU utilization level on throughput at proxy server  
The latency observed in Figure 14 can be considered ideal, since the CPU load was 
under 5% throughout the experiment. However, the current study realizes that in a practical 
environment, a server typically runs multiple applications and hence it is vital to study the 
latencies under various CPU utilization levels. To test this, the current study uses Stress-ng 
[112] tool to emulate the desired CPU loads the proxy server VM and evaluates the time taken 
to transform the data from AES scheme to FHE scheme. For example, to simulate a CPU 
utilization of 40% a command as shown in Figure 15  was used. 
  
Figure 15. An example of stress-ng command line to emulate a CPU load of 40% 
   
To test the performance, random records from TELE ECG database with a sampling 
frequency of 500Hz were chosen. The first parameter used for evaluation is the summation of 
the communication latency (defined as the time taken for the proxy server VM to receive the 
encrypted data as a JSON from the android device) and computation latency (defined as the 
time taken at the proxy server to parse the JSON data and prepare it for homomorphic 
decryption). The second parameter used for evaluation is the computation latency at the proxy 
server (defined as the time taken to perform homomorphic evaluation of the decryption 
function). The performance of the above parameters was evaluated for  𝐶𝑃𝑈 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑠 = 
 8 %, 15%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 70% 𝑎𝑛𝑑 80%. Figure 16 shows the performance of the 
evaluation parameters for difference values of CPU loads. It is observed that with higher loads 
on CPU, the proxy server needed longer time to receive the JSON packet and parse it. 
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However, the time taken for the server to perform homomorphic decryption increases 
modestly. This is because as mentioned earlier, with off-line preprocessing the operations 
required during online processing are data encoding and XORing the encoded data with the 
homomorphic encrypted key streams, which are lightweight in nature. Since the overall 
throughput of a proxy server for proxy re-ciphering as a service depends on both the 
parameters, it can be inferred that the throughput of the proxy server for proxy re-ciphering as 
a service decreases with increased CPU loads. However, the homomorphic evaluation of the 
decryption function in stream cipher mode does not require a high computational cost even 
during high CPU utilization levels.    
 
Figure 16. Evaluation of latency at a proxy server under various CPU loads 
 
Analysis of end-to-end latency for an end-user  
Next, to understand the impact of the system on the end-user, the current study 
evaluates the following parameters: i) time taken to share data from proxy server to cloud 
server (upload) ii) time taken for an end-user to receive the data from cloud server (download) 
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iii) time taken for an end-user to decrypt the received data (decryption) iv) time taken to delete 
an existing entry in the cloud server upon an end-user request (deletion). Each evaluation 
parameter was tested in two chosen networks during two fixed times of the day (10 am and 4 
pm) to get a holistic view of the overall latency. The values observed in Figure 17 is an average 
of the 10 trials for each experiment. It is observed that deletion operation takes the least amount 
of time. This operation corresponds to deleting the user requested entry from the Azure blob 
storage. Next, it can be observed that upload time is lesser compared to the download time. 
This is because, as discussed in Chapter 3, for every healthcare organization, the current study 
chooses proxy servers that are closest (VMs are placed in same regions) to the cloud service 
provider. Hence, the time taken for data to reach blob storage from VM in Block A is relatively 
smaller compared to time taken to download data from the blob storage for an end-user (VM 
in a different region).   Finally, it can be observed that the homomorphic decryption of cloud 
data requires around 730ms in a VM in Block C with 1GB RAM.  
 
 
Figure 17. Evaluation of latency for upload, download, decrypt and delete operations 
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To evaluate the overall usability of the framework, it is critical to evaluate the end-to-
end latency of this workflow. End-to-end latency in the current context can be expressed as a 
summation of the following latencies : a) computation latency at the Android emulator to 
encrypt device data b) communication latency to send the AES encrypted data to a proxy server 
VM c) computation latency at the proxy server VM to transform AES encrypted device data 
to homomorphic encrypted device data d) communication latency to send the homomorphic 
ciphertext to the cloud compute server e) computation latency at the cloud server to perform 
privacy-preserving computations on the homomorphic data as required by the application 
f)communication latency to send homomorphic result  of the cloud-computation to the end-
user g)computation latency at the end-user VM to decrypt the homomorphic result to view the 
plaintext result.  The current study does not implement the application logic at the cloud 
compute server. Hence it is assumed that cloud servers take 𝑥 𝑚𝑠 to execute an FHE based 
computation, based on the application. For a 32-byte of device data, the end-to-end latency 
from the above-mentioned experiments is observed to be:  (𝑎) 1𝑚𝑠 + (𝑏) 1𝑚𝑠 + (𝑐) 4𝑚𝑠 +
(𝑑) 130𝑚𝑠 + (𝑒) 𝑥 + (𝑓) 170𝑚𝑠 + (𝑔) 730𝑚𝑠 = 1036 + 𝑥 𝑚𝑠.  If there is no cloud-
processing required and if an end-user is interested in decrypting the device data using their 
private key, then  𝑥 = 0 and hence the total latency can be around 1036𝑚𝑠. Along the same 
lines, for a 500 Hz device data, assuming a cloud-computation time of 𝑥 𝑚𝑠 to produce a 32-
byte computation result, the end-to-end latency from the earlier experiments is observed to be: 
(𝑎) 114𝑚𝑠 + (𝑏) 488𝑚𝑠 + (𝑐) 712𝑚𝑠 + (𝑑) 13039 𝑚𝑠 + (𝑒) 𝑥 + (𝑓) 170𝑚𝑠 +
(𝑔) 730𝑚𝑠 = 15253 + 𝑥 𝑚𝑠 . It should be noted that the end-to-end latency value of close to 
 15.2 + 𝑥 𝑠  is observed without any optimization in the above-mentioned latencies. However, 
with solutions like, homomorphic ciphertext packing to allow SIMD operations, homomorphic 
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dimension reduction before transmission to an end-user, a reduced latency can be achieved in 
practice. Also, it can be observed that the major contributor to the high latency is the upload 
time of homomorphic encrypted ciphertext to the cloud server from the proxy server. However, 
as explained in chapter 4, this value can be reduced based on the deployment of the service 
and the location of the servers. For example, if proxy servers and the cloud servers are hosted 
by the same provider and the servers are in the same region, the communication latency can be 
greatly reduced. 
 
Analysis of upper bound on the post-compromise attack window 
Finally, the study evaluates the feasibility of a dynamic key refresh operation for an 
IoT device. To assess this, the study calculates the time taken at the android emulator (acting 
as medical device) to generate new key, the time taken at the android emulator (acting as 
gateway) to generate collisions using trapdoor key and the total time taken to send random 
numbers between gateway-medical device and gateway-key manager server. Figure 18 shows 
that the total computation time taken at the android emulator to generate a dynamic key is 
around 157𝑚𝑠. The current study did not record the time taken at the key manager server to 
generate the key since it is assumed that KMS is computationally more powerful compared to 
an android emulator and hence the overhead will be negligible, due to the infrequent nature of 
this operation. It can be observed that finding the collision 𝑟2 at the gateway (Android device) 
takes only around 5s. This is due to the lightweight nature of collision calculation, as shown in 
Algorithm 6. Finally, to share 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑, 𝑟1, 𝑟2 over the channel, the communication cost is 
around 110𝑚𝑠. Thus, it can be observed that the overall time taken to dynamically renew 
encryption keys is modest and not heavy weight on the resource constrained IoT device. Thus, 
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the current scheme limits the time window between attack-detection and key-refresh to around 
(157 𝑚𝑠 + 5 𝑚𝑠 + 110  𝑚𝑠 = 272 𝑚𝑠 ) 280𝑚𝑠, limiting the secure data exposure to an 
adversary.  
 
Figure 18. Evaluation of total latency to dynamically refresh an encryption key  
 
5.2 Theoretical Evaluation 
In this section the current study will briefly evaluate the security properties of the 
system and discuss how the current study resists the threats discussed in chapter 3.  
The main security goals of the current study are to ensure confidentiality of the data, 
privacy of the users and availability of the service from passive and active. This study currently 
does not focus on the integrity of the data, but the focus is primarily given to the confidentiality 
and availability aspects of the CIA triad. Focusing on integrity of the data is deferred for the 
future works.   
This section analyzes the security properties of the proposed work against commonly 
faced threats discussed in chapter 3.  
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Threat 1: Cloud database/server compromise:  
The current study does not store any device keys in the cloud servers. Instead, it stores 
the homomorphic encryption public keys of the users to perform privacy-preserving 
computations. The cloud servers primarily store the homomorphic encrypted device data 
received from the IoT devices. The security of homomorphic encrypted data stored in the cloud 
servers directly follows the security of the BGV scheme. The security of BGV homomorphic 
scheme is based on Ring-Learning with Errors (RLWE) problem, which is a hard problem 
related to high-dimensional lattices. RLWE guarantee a 2𝜆 security against known attacks, 
where 𝜆 is a security parameter [61]. The default value of the security parameter used in HElib 
library (and thus in this work as well) is 80 bits of security.  
The current system assumes the cloud servers to be resilient against loss of availability 
attacks, such as denial of service.   
 
 Threat 2: Proxy server compromise   
The current study does not store any device keys in the proxy servers. Instead, it stores 
the shares of the device keys encrypted under homomorphic encryption scheme in 𝑛 proxy 
servers and the reconstructed homomorphic device keys in 𝑚 proxy servers. The security of 
the homomorphic encrypted device keys is directly derived from the security of  BGV scheme, 
that are based on RLWE and have a 2𝜆 security [61] against known attacks, as mentioned 
above. The homomorphic encrypted device key shares are further encrypted using ChaCha20 
encryption scheme as per Krawczyk’s distribution scheme. ChaCha20 is practically found to 
be secure so far [115]-[116]. Upon reconstruction at the proxy servers, the security of 
homomorphic device keys is once again guaranteed by the security of BGV encryption scheme.  
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The following section evaluates the performance of proxy servers against loss of 
availability attacks.   
 In the current study, a total of 𝑚 proxy servers provide service to every health care 
organization. As discussed in Chapter 3, the system parameters 𝑚, 𝑘, 𝑛 are chosen such that 
the following requirement is satisfied 𝑛 − 𝑚 ≥ 𝑘 .  The requirement for this condition is 
directly derived from the resiliency requirements of the system. In the current world of 
healthcare industries, adversaries targeting a particular healthcare organization is a very 
relevant and a critical issue [115]–[117] especially with a 13% increase in the denial of service 
based attacks from the past year [118] which is also expected to grow even further. When an 
adversary targets a specific healthcare organization, attacking the 𝑚 proxy servers by either 
crashing the servers or corrupting the data can cause sufficient damages to the service. 
However, in the current system, 𝑛 − 𝑚 ≥ 𝑘 and the homomorphic key shares of the IoT 
devices are shared across 𝑛 servers. Hence by the property of threshold secret sharing, it is 
possible to reconstruct the data required to provide service to the healthcare organization. If an 
attacker targets the proxy servers arbitrarily, the system is resilient to loss of servers up to 𝑛 −
𝑘, by the property of threshold secret sharing. That is, if an attacker attacks 𝑝 servers, as long 
as 𝑝 ≤ 𝑛 − 𝑘 ,  the system is resilient to the denial of service attack or corruption of data attack. 
 
Threat 3: Network-based attack 
In the current study, medical devices encrypt data using AES-128-bit encryption in 
counter mode before sending them out. Although researchers have studied attacks [119]–[122] 
against AES, when implemented correctly AES is currently secure against any practical attack 
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as long as an adversary does not have access to the encryption key. This guarantees data 
security during acquisition in the device. 
The communication between the medical device and the gateway is done over a local 
Bluetooth low energy (BTLE) link. One of the best features of BTLE, according to its 
specifications is its privacy awareness [123] that allows a participating device to change its 
private address to avoid tracking. However literature [68] shows that this is not used in practice. 
In addition,  BTLE communication channel can be protected by means of BTLE encryption, 
However works like [65] have shown that the link is typically unprotected relying on device 
level encryption to secure the data during transit. Thus, as long as the device encryption key is 
secure, the communication between an IoT device and the gateway is protected against an 
eavesdropper. The communication channels between gateway-proxy server, proxy server-
cloud server and cloud server-end user are secured with HTTPS.  
 
Threat 4: Byzantine proxy servers  
 The above discussions so far assume that all the proxy servers are honest but non-
trusted. This is indeed one of the assumptions of the current study. However, if an attacker is 
successful in controlling the behavior of a few servers in the system during the key 
reconstruction phase, this can result in a loss of service due to incorrect key reconstruction at 
the honest servers. The security requirement of the system in the presence of such byzantine 
servers are discussed now.  
Let 𝑓 denote the number of byzantine proxy servers. The 𝑓 proxy servers can corrupt 
their shares or can arbitrarily distribute corrupt shares to the 𝑚 proxy servers. This scenario is 
different from typical PBFT considerations since each server holds a share that is unique to the 
80 
 
 
 
server. During share reconstruction phase, the 𝑚 proxy servers wait to receive shares from at 
least 𝑘 − 𝑚 servers. So, it is necessary that a)  𝑓 < 𝑚 (a coalition of malicious only servers 
should not be chosen to provide service to a healthcare organization), b)  𝑛 − 𝑓 ≥ 𝑘 (there 
should always be enough honest servers in the system to reconstruct homomorphic keys, if 
required) and c) 𝑚 < 𝑘 ( a pool of proxy servers providing service to an organization should 
not be able to reconstruct keys for devices from other organizations, as per the principle of 
least privilege). With these relations it can be inferred that 𝟐𝒇 < 𝒏 . That is, 𝑛 should at least 
be 2𝑓 + 1 . Under these circumstances, to reconstruct the homomorphic keys, there should be 
at least 𝑘 honest server shares in any pool of shares, since some of them can be byzantine 
shares. To reconstruct the secret shares in the presence of malicious server shares, Kwarczyk 
extended his original secret sharing scheme from a computational secret sharing scheme to a 
robust secret sharing [85] by  adding digital fingerprints to the shares at the time of distribution. 
Thus utilizing the work described in [124] can provide fault tolerance up to 𝑓 server  
corruptions during key reconstruction. Krawczyk’s robust secret sharing scheme introduces a 
total blow-up in the share sizes of  ≅
𝑛
𝑛−𝑓
 [124].   
 
Threat 4: IoT device compromise  
This section first evaluates the security properties of the dynamic key refresh scheme 
against the requirements described in Chapter 3. Then the performance of the system towards 
the threat is discussed.  
The expected properties of a key refresh scheme introduced in Chapter 3 are discussed now.  
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Uniqueness of encryption keys 
 From the collision resistance property of the Chameleon hash function [92] the 
following can be inferred: 
 Given two pairs  𝑚1, 𝑟1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚2, 𝑟2, where 𝑚1 ≠ 𝑚2  𝑎𝑛𝑑 for 𝑚1, 𝑚2 ∈
𝑍𝑞
∗  and 𝑟1, 𝑟2 ∈ 𝑍𝑞
∗ , probability of 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑀(𝑚1, ℎ𝑘, 𝑟1) = 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑀(𝑚2, ℎ𝑘, 𝑟2) is negligible 
without the knowledge of a trapdoor key, where ℎ𝑘 is the hashing key . 
In the current study 𝑚 = XOR( 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑,   𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑).Every medical device has a unique 
identifier 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑. Using a CSPRNG will ensure that 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑 generated for the devices are 
unique. Thus, for two devices with 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑1 and 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑2 , 𝑚1 ≠ 𝑚2 and hence the key 
generated from chameleon hash functions 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑀(𝑚1, ℎ𝑘, 𝑟1) and 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑀(𝑚2, ℎ𝑘, 𝑟2) are 
unique.  
Randomness of encryption keys  
The uniformity property of Chameleon hash function states that the probability 
distribution functions of the  𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑀(𝑚, ℎ𝑘, 𝑟) for all messages 𝑚 and for a random number 𝑟 
chosen at random is indistinguishable [92].  The Semantic security of chameleon hash 
functions which is derived from the uniformity property guarantees that the probability 
distributions of the random variables 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑀(𝑚1, ℎ𝑘, 𝑟) and 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑀(𝑚2, ℎ𝑘, 𝑟) for messages 
𝑚1 and 𝑚2 are computationally indistinguishable [125]. This also means that the conditional 
entropy 𝐻(𝑚 ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ⁄ ) of a message 𝑚 given its hash ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ equals the total entropy of the 
message 𝑚 , 𝐻(𝑚) [126]. Since an attacker may learn about 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑 during a compromise, 
this can reduce the entropy of 𝑚, 𝐻(𝑚).  The probability of an attacker knowing the bits of 
𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑  can be expressed as : 𝑃(𝑖𝑑𝑖 = 1) = 𝑤 , where  0 ≤ 𝑤 ≤ 1 and    0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ |𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑|.  
Since 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑 used in 𝑚1 = XOR( 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑,   𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑) is generated using a CSPRNG, the 
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probability of an attacker knowing the bits can be expressed as    P(𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖=1)=0.5 , 0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤
|𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑|.  Thus, the probability of an attacker guessing the bits of dynamic device id 
generated from 𝑚 = XOR( 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑,   𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑) can be expressed as follows:  
 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 = 1) = 𝑃(𝑖𝑑𝑖 = 1) ∗ 𝑃(𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖 = 0) + 𝑃(𝑖𝑑𝑖 = 0) ∗ 𝑃(𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖 = 1) 
 𝑤 ∗ 0.5 + (1 − 𝑤) ∗ 0.5  
 0.5 
Thus, the probability is same as guessing the bits. Thus, the XOR operation overcomes 
a potential loss of entropy if 𝑚 = 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑 during a device-key compromise. This is the reason 
the study generates a dynamic-id for the IoT device during dynamic key refresh using 𝑚 =
XOR( 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑑,   𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑑).  
 
Correctness of encryption keys  
One of the important conditions of a key refresh operation is that the new keys 
generated at the IoT device end and the KMS end exactly match. This is defined as the 
correctness as the key refresh scheme. The correctness of the scheme used in this study directly 
follows the correctness of Chameleon hash functions. 
 
Latency of key refresh algorithm 
The computational and communicational latency associated with the proposed scheme 
is discussed under the experimental evaluation section. The communication complexity is 2|𝑟| 
where r is the random number (𝑟1, 𝑟2) shared by the gateway device with the medical device 
and the KMS.  
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Post-compromise Secrecy of the system 
A scheme that guarantees two participating nodes to communicate securely even when 
the keys protecting the communication are compromised is informally termed to provide post-
compromise secrecy [77]. Authors in [127] define post-compromise security as “Full 
compromise of a node at a point in time does not reveal future messages sent within the group”. 
IoT devices that use static encryption keys and no session keys suffer from post-compromise 
security where the advantage of an adversary possessing the knowledge of device encryption 
keys is non-zero. The current study addresses a weaker notion of post-compromise security, 
which it now defines with the help of Figure 19 .    
Definition 2: A session under attack at time 𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 is post-compromise secure if there 
exists an intermediate session between  𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘  and 𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒 (time of  compromise)  such 
that  
(i) 𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 ≠ 𝑖𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒 and  
(ii) 𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 + 𝑥.  𝑟1 =  𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟 + 𝑥.  𝑟2 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞  
where,  
𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 , 𝑖𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒 are dynamic ids used by an IoT device to generate device 
encryption keys used during time 𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘  and 𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒 respectively ( using 
𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑀(𝑖𝑑, ℎ𝑘, 𝑟1)) 
𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟 is the id used by KMS to generate the synchronized device key using 
𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑀(𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟 , ℎ𝑘, 𝑟2) 
𝑥 is the trapdoor for Chameleon hash function  
𝑟1 is a random number used to generate chameleon collision 𝑟2 .  
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Figure 19. An example of attack scenario to define post-compromise security  
 
The above definition is explained in greater detail now. If the dynamic-id used by an 
IoT device to generate device encryption keys before 𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒 is 𝑖𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒 , then the 
device key available to an attacker at the time of compromise can be expressed as 𝑘𝑒𝑦1 =
 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑀(𝑖𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒  , ℎ𝑘, 𝑟1).  As per the definition, after 𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒 let us assume that there 
existed a small time window (~280 𝑚𝑠 for the current testbed) before an attack such that a) the 
dynamic-id of an IoT device is updated to  𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘  where 𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 ≠ 𝑖𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒 and b) a 
new collision 𝑟2′ is calculated using random variable 𝑟1′ and the trapdoor key 𝑥. Then the new 
encryption keys refreshed by the IoT device after this time window can be expressed as 𝑘𝑒𝑦2 =
 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑀(𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 , ℎ𝑘, 𝑟1
′), while the keys refreshed at the KMS can be expressed as 𝑘𝑒𝑦2′ =
 𝐶𝐻𝐴𝑀(𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟 , ℎ𝑘, 𝑟2′). By the property of chameleon collision, it can be proven that 
𝑘𝑒𝑦2 = 𝑘𝑒𝑦2’.  
Now, to prove the post-compromise security of the framework, let us assume the 
contrary. Let us assume that the system is not post-compromise secure at 𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 . This means 
that an adversary can use 𝑘𝑒𝑦1 stolen at 𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒 to learn about encrypted IoT device data 
during 𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 .However, if 𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 > 𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒 and if the system calculated 𝑟1
′ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑟2′ using 
𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 + 𝑥.  𝑟1′ =  𝑚𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑟 + 𝑥.  𝑟2′ 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞 , then during  𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘  the device data is encrypted 
using 𝑘𝑒𝑦2.  By the collision resistance property of chameleon hash function, 𝑃(𝑘𝑒𝑦1 =
𝑘𝑒𝑦2)  ≅ 𝜀, where 𝜀 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 when 𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 ≠ 𝑖𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒. Thus, this 
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invalidates the assumption that an attacker can use  𝑘𝑒𝑦1 stolen at 𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒 to learn about 
encrypted IoT device data during 𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘  , proving that the system is post-compromise secure, 
under the given conditions.  
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CHAPTER 6.    CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
6.1 Summary  
 This thesis investigates a practical and scalable solution to enable long-term secure and 
privacy preserving cloud computation for IoT devices. To this end, this thesis proposes 
utilizing distributed semi-trusted proxy servers, threshold secret sharing schemes and 
chameleon hash functions to provide proxy re-ciphering as a service. The proposed framework 
securely transforms data encrypted by IoT devices to a fully homomorphic encrypted data, 
thereby enabling secure cloud computation on the data. To evaluate the framework, testbed-
based experiments were performed, and the proposed algorithms were individually analyzed. 
It was observed that although a distributed proxy server-based solution introduces additional 
delays, the security guarantees gained by such a distributed system outweighs the 
computational and communicational overhead. Also, it was inferred from the experiments that 
homomorphic evaluation of AES in stream cipher mode provides better throughput compared 
to the block cipher mode, and this can be further improved with an offline pre-processing. The 
proposed framework was also tested during diverse CPU loads to emulate a practical busy 
server. It was inferred that with an offline pre-processing of the counter values, the 
computations required during the online processing phase are lightweight and thus the latency 
increases only by a modest amount, even during high CPU loads. Furthermore, the study also 
evaluates the total time taken to dynamically refresh keys between an IoT device and the key 
manager server as it provides an upper bound on attack window available to an adversary after 
a key compromise. Finally, the study analyzes the key security properties of the proposed 
scheme and evaluates it against the critical threats discussed in Chapter 3. The salient features 
of the proposed framework are: 
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i) it does not require IoT device users to use additional (fully-trusted) hardware  
ii) it accounts for real-world implementations where device vendors do not store device 
encryption keys in end-user (smartphone like) devices 
iii) it uses libraries that are publicly available and tested for their performance by the 
authors, guaranteeing reliability and accessibility for application developers  
iv) it introduces a modest computational overhead for key manager servers maintained by 
device vendors and a negligible computational overhead at the IoT devices, making 
the framework readily adoptable and back-portable with existing solutions 
v) it encourages cloud service providers to store minimal yet adequate information to 
provide service to end-users, avoiding secondary data usage and privacy violations  
vi) it guarantees security for past and future data for IoT devices by discouraging 
unnecessary storage of raw device data and by allowing devices to dynamical refresh 
keys after a compromise  
vii) it studies the expansion in size with homomorphic encryption schemes and provides 
an efficient storage solution using threshold secret sharing schemes that also 
guarantees resilience against loss of availability of service and loss/ corruption of data  
 
These salient features are the result of tailoring the framework to meet the requirements 
of a practical solution described in Chapter 3.  Thus, it can be inferred that Proxy re-ciphering 
as a service is a practical, scalable and an easy-to-adopt secure framework that guarantees 
long-term privacy-preserving cloud computations for encrypted IoT data. 
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6.2 Limitations and Future work  
Limitations  
• Knowledge about device compromise: The system assumes the knowledge of a device 
compromise to initiate key refresh request. Although this can be true for active attacks, in 
many real-world IoT applications, such an information may not be readily available.  
• Storage: Fully homomorphic encryption scheme is a relatively new and active research 
area allowing privacy preserving computations on encrypted data. It was observed from 
the experiments that the cipher text size expansion compared to the underlying plaintext is 
high. Thus, the storage overhead when adopting an FHE based solution can still be high.  
• End-user device: The current study considers laptops like devices to receive encrypted 
insights and reports from the cloud servers. When an optimized version of HElib library 
which is compatible with smartphones is available, current work can be extended to include 
smart phones as end-user devices.  
• Default parameters: The current study uses the default parameter values for the libraries 
used from the literature. For example, the system parameters used for homomorphic 
evaluation of AES are the default values available in the HElib library. Depending on the 
actual application logic, parameter values other than the ones used in the current study 
might be required.   
 
Future work 
• Developing a fully homomorphic encryption-based solution in the cloud would be the 
interesting next step. This is currently an on-going area of research where multiple real-
world applications are still unexplored.   
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• Evaluating and proposing a technique for IoT devices to securely store the refreshed encryption 
keys within the device-hardware could be an interesting future work.  
• During dynamic key refresh, the current study assumes a gateway device to be a fully trusted 
intermediary. Another interesting problem for the future work would be to develop a robust 
key refreshing scheme that addresses the assumption of device compromise-knowledge and 
uses no intermediary, like a gateway device.  
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